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COCAINE PROHIBITION: 
DRUG-INDUCED MADNESS IN THE 
WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
ARTHUR L. BERNEY* 
Colombia and the United States share the unhappy distinction of 
being two of the most violent democracies in the world, because of a 
common, reciprocal condition: drug addiction. This addiction is the 
addiction to a failed policy: prohibition. The adherence to this policy 
is more than irrational; it is mad. 
It is the thesis of this paper that unless one or more of the major 
drug consuming and producing nations "kicks the habit" of drug 
prohibition, the addiction to this failed policy will cleave the societies 
affected and lead to repressive measures inimical to democratic gov-
ernance. 
With apologies for mixing war and illness metaphors, the basis for 
this dark prognosis will be explored first by reviewing the already 
terrible consequences of the long-running ''war on drugs," concentrat-
ing mainly on the United States, the leader in this war, and second by 
identifying the powerful obstacles to abandoning this war policy. In 
keeping with this pessimistic assessment, the final section will consider 
the only course left: some radical strategies. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
According to recent polls and political wisdom, crime has once 
again become the leading cause of concern to Americans. I Part of the 
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge the 
invaluable research of his assistants, Elizabeth Madden and jeff Goss. He also thanks Dean Avi 
Soifer, as well as former students, Vickie Feeman and Scott Pitman for their contributions to a 
paper presented at the First Congress on Caribbean Legal Studies: Globalization, Law, and the 
Contemporary Caribbean, University of Puerto Rico School of Law, April 20-22, 1994. Parts of 
that presentation found their way into this Article. 
I Despite all the emphasis on health care in 1993-94, a 1994 poll showed that crime is cited 
by voters as the most important problem facing the country. Robin Toner, Health Impasse Souring 
Voters, New PoUFinds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1994, at AI, A18; see also Steven Holmes, A Business 
Gathering Focuses on Grime, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1994, at A30; Richard Berke, Grime is Becoming 
Nation's Top Fear, N.Y. TIMES, jan. 23, 1994, at AI. Although there is strong public concern about 
crime, recent statistics generally show a downward trend in criminal activities. From 1991 to 1992, 
the crime rate decreased 2.9% for number of offenses, and 4.0% for the overall crime rate per 
100,000 inhabitants. FBI, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REpORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED 
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explanation for this heightened concern may be the perception that 
our society is becoming increasingly violent. This perception is power-
fully reinforced by two sources: the media2 and politicalleaders.3 Vio-
lence, particularly random violence of the kind that occurs regularly 
in large cities, generates fear and insecurity. Politicians understand the 
almost certain power of fear as a means of manipulating the polis. 
Indeed, to varying degrees every president in living memory has played 
the crime/fear card. In recent years, the "trump card" in this play has 
been drugs. 
There is no reliable evidence that drug use, per se, leads to vio-
lence.4 The direct causal connections between illicit drug trafficking 
and violence, however, are clear and undeniable. There is violence at 
the street level between rival drug dealers in deadly competition for 
STATES 19925 (1993) [hereinafter CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1992]; see also Clifford Krauss, 
Urban Crime Rates Falling this Year, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1994, at A14. 
Although the emphasis throughout this discussion will be on the United States, there is every 
reason to believe that the public perception regarding crime and violence is similar in Latin 
America. See generally KEVIN JACK RILEY, THE IMPLICATIONS OF COLOMBIAN DRUG INDUSTRY AND 
DEATH SQUAD POLITICAL VIOLENCE FOR U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS POLICY (1993) (discussing the 
Colombian public's primary concern with terrorism and political violence). 
2 Depictions of violence attract and mesmerize the viewing public. See john T. Schuler & 
Arthur McBride, Notes from the Front: A Dissident Law-Enforcement Perspective on Drug Prohibition, 
18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 893,913 (1990). A recent study found that more than 50% oflocal television 
broadcasting in the Chicago area was devoted to violence. Mark Fitzgerald, Newspapers & Violence 
Coverage, ED. & PUB. MAG., june 18, 1994, at 14. 
3 Violence portrayed by the media has reached levels that have attracted a political response. 
A number of proposals for containing and regulating depictions of violence in the broadcast 
media have been discussed by political leaders. See Raymond L. Fischer, Is it Possible to Regulate 
Television Violence?, 123 USA TODAY MAG., july, 1994, at 72; see also Laurie jones, AMA: Give 
Parents Tools to Judge Tv, Video Violence, 37 AM. MED. NEWS,july 25, 1994, at 8; Richard C. Reuben, 
Pulling the Plug on TV Violence, 14 CAL. LAw.,jan. 1994, at 39 (interview discussion with Professors 
Cass Sunstein and Kathleen Sullivan). The fear of violence was also used to muster support for 
the $30 billion crime bill in july 1994. See Bill Walsh, Clinton: Law Might Have Saved Boy, 
TIMES-PICAYUNE, july 17, 1994, at Bl. 
4 james Ostrowski, The Moral and Practical Case for Legalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 607, 
651 (1990). Cocaine, unlike other addictive drugs, does have a potential for provoking irrational 
and violent behavior. Gregory A. Loken & james Kennedy, Legal Cocaine and Kids: The Very 
Bitterness of Shame, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 567, 586 (1990). The fact that persons arrested for other 
crimes also test positive for drug use in a large number of cases does not establish any causal 
linkage. The absence of such a link, however, does not suggest that use of cocaine has no serious, 
deleterious consequences. For a discussion of cocaine and its effects, see COCAINE: A CLINICIAN'S 
HANDBOOK (Arnold M. Washton & Mark S. Gold eds., 1987) [hereinafter CLINICIAN'S HAND-
BOOK]. But see Loken & Kennedy, supra, at 568 (citing Gawin & Ellinwood, Cocaine and Other 
Stimulants: Actions, Abuse, and Treatment, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173 (1988), providing an 
analysis of the historical view that cocaine is relatively safe). One unpublished study found that 
of 414 randomly selected homicides in New York City, 218 were considered "drug-related." 
Thirty-one of the latter homicides were classified as "psychopharmocological" and of those, crack 
was a factor in only five. Schuler & McBride, supra note 2, at 901 nAO (citations omitted). 
1995] COCAINE PROHIBITION 21 
territory and market-at both the wholesale and retail level. This 
violence, though directed at operatives in the illicit drug trade, ran-
domly yet regularly impacts persons who have no connection with the 
drug trade other than geography. Bystander-victims, too often children 
in harm's way,5 are only the more obvious victims. Whole neighbor-
hoods, including most low-income housing projects in every major city, 
are traumatized by the violence of drug operatives.6 
In addition, violence is committed by and against the police in the 
course of enforcing and resisting drug prohibition laws, at both the 
local and nationallevels.7 Perhaps epitomizing the violence associated 
with the illicit drug trade are the open and shocking attacks by mem-
bers of drug cartels against organized government itself.8 
Of course, violence begets violence. Wherever blame-fixing or an 
unrewarding search for cause and effect may lead, there can be little 
doubt that the nations of the world are caught in a vicious, escalating 
cycle of violence and counter-violence in connection with the effort to 
5 According to New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, "an unprecedented 500 New York 
City children were shot" in 1993. See Kath F. Rocklen, End War on Drugs: Too Many Casualties, 
NAT'L LJ.,July 25,1994, at A19. Forty percent of homicides were estimated to be attributable to 
drug-related incidents. Id. at A20. 
6 See, e.g., Lisa Chedekel, Two Neighborhoods Fight Back Against Wave of Shootings, North Street 
Complex's Residents Ask for a Fence to Block Dealers' Routes, HARTFORD COURANT, May 12, 1994, 
at D3; see also infra note III and accompanying text (regarding the evictions of tenants in public 
housing for household drug dealing). 
7 The Los Angeles riots in the spring of 1992 were set off by the acquittal of four white police 
officers accused of the videotaped beating of Rodney King, an African-American man. The 
officers asserted that King was under the influence of the drug PCP, or phencyclidine, and that 
this contributed to the difficulty of subduing him. See Andrew Okun, As Defense Case opens Officer 
Says King was Laughing, REUTERS N.AM. WIRE, Mar. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, 
REUTERS File. 
In Boston, a police raid on the wrong apartment resulted in the death of a minister who was 
so frightened by the raid that he had a heart attack. See Brian McGrory & Toni Locy, Minister 
Dies After Botched Drug Raid: Suffered Heart Attack in Apartment, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 1994, 
at Bl. 
Police officers are also injured in drug raids. See, e.g., Officers'Injuries Cripple Investigation 
into Drug-Raid Disaster, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 1993, at IB; 2 Caps Hurt in Raid on 
Joliet Drug Ring, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1987, at C2. 
8 In 1989, presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galan in Colombia was assassinated. See 
Maureen Dowd, U.S. Giving Bogota $65 Million in Aid to Fight Drug War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 
1989, at AI; Eugene Robinson, Colombian Candidate Murdered; President Sets Moves Against Drug 
Lords, Reinstates Extradition, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1989, at AI; see also James Brooke, War Report 
from Colombia: Fight Will Be Long, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1989, at A12 (discussing traffickers' threats 
to kill ten judges for every Colombian extradited to the United States, and the killing of 
approximately a dozen Colombian Supreme Court judges by the traffickers); Colombian Judge 
(bl,its Amid Threats, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1987, at A25; Tyler Bridges, Colombian Judges Face 
Threats, Assassination; Violence lfy Drug Traffickers Leads to Release of Suspects, Leaving Police 
Dismayed, WASH. POST, Nov .. 22,1986, at A24. 
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suppress the use of illicit drugs. The pernicious effect of this cycle of 
violence cannot and will not be broken until either government or the 
drug dealers relent. For various reasons, the hope that the drug dealers 
will relent is unrealistic.9 Our hope and trust must, perforce, be placed 
in government. 
Indeed, the primary obligation of government is to serve the 
general welfare. If over a substantial period of time the policy of 
prohibition is unleashing violence and exacerbating insecurity, without 
demonstrating any appreciable reduction in the deleterious effects of 
drug use among the class of users,10 it is hard to deny that the general 
welfare is not being served. A policy with no provable benefits and 
substantial human costs, by definition, is not in the public interest. A 
second, related reason for an affirmative response from government 
pertains to economic costs. The costs of the prohibition regime estab-
lished by the United States during the better part of this century are 
enormous. ll The final reason that governments, particularly demo-
cratic governments, must end or curtail existing drug policies, is that 
these policies pose deep and growing threats to democratic values.12 
This paper takes up the foregoing matters in the context mainly 
of the trade and use of one drug: cocaine.13 This focus is based on the 
fact that cocaine is produced in our hemisphere and thus concerns 
9 The demand for psychotropic drugs has existed throughout human history. Steve Jonas, 
Solving the Drug Problem: A Public Health Approach to the Reduction of the Use and Abuse of Both 
Legal and Illegal Recreational Drugs, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 751,756 (1990). Although this demand 
may fluctuate over time and vary from society to society, it apparently never disappears completely. 
So long as the demand persists, and there is great profit to be made by satisfying that demand, 
there will always be those who will undertake to supply that demand. Humans regularly engage 
in far riskier activity, for far less promise of profit, than that associated with the supply of 
psychotropic drugs. See id. at 756-57. 
10 See Peter H. Smith, The Political Economy of Drugs: Conceptual Issues and Policy options, in 
DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 4-5 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1992) [hereinafter DRUG POLICY IN THE 
AMERICAS]. A 1993 survey on household drug abuse reported no change in the number of 
current illicit drug users between 1992 and 1993-11.4 and 11.7 million respectively. 1993 NAT'L 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN Svcs. 7 (1994). Drug 
use, however, has declined since 1985, when there were 22.3 million users. Id. The survey also 
shows that in 1993, the prevalence of illicit drug use for individuals twelve years and older was 
at the highest percentage since 1979, a rate of 37.2% versus 33.3%. See id. at Appendix 5, Table 
2, Prevalence of Any Illicit Drug Use 1979-1993. 
II See infra notes 61-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of economic costs. 
12 See infra notes 82-148 and accompanying text for a discussion of the threat to democracy. 
13 In general, unless otherwise indicated by text or context, the generic term "drug" is used 
in this paper to refer to cocaine and its derivatives. Cocaine has been described as the following: 
Cocaine is a crystalline alkaloid obtained from coca leaves that tends to induce 
sensations of stimulation and euphoria; in white powdery form known as cocaine 
hydrochloride ... it can be ingested through inhalation ("snorting" through the 
nose or "freebasing" through a pipe or tube) or, dissolved in water, through intra-
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United States relations within the Americas, relations that are often 
characterized as being of prime importance. The second reason for 
focusing on cocaine is that it appears to be the "hard drug" that most 
concerns our law enforcement agencies and the public at this mo-
ment. 14 
The first section of this paper will discuss the three aforemen-
tioned reasons for urging govern men ts to relinquish their efforts to 
control drug use through prohibition: human costs, economic costs, and 
the threat to democracy. 
This section is drawn largely from existing literature and is in-
tended to serve as an informational backdrop.15 Although the points 
made in this first section are organized and expressed as an implicit 
argument against the continuance of drug prohibition, there is no 
effort to offer a brief for legalization or decriminalization,16 because 
the chance that the United States (the international leader of the 
venous injection; combined with baking soda and water and heated-creating a 
form of cocaine known as "crack"-it can be ingested by either smoking or freebasing. 
Smith, supra note 10, at 2. Cocaine is derived from coca leaf grown almost exclusively in the 
Andean region of South America. A combination of soil conditions, climate, and agricultural 
practice limit its production essentially to Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador. See id. at 8-9; 
see also Elane Alvarez, Coca Production in Peru, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, 
at 72; Flavio Machicado, Coca Production in Bolivia, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra 
note 10, at 88. In 1990, Latin America produced 310,170 metric tons of coca leaf, a 6.5% increase 
over the figure for 1987, with most of the production coming from Peru, which produced 196,900 
metric tons, followed by Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador. Smith, supra note 10, at 8 (citing U.S. 
DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS MATTERS 1991 FIGURES FOR LATIN AMERICAN 
PRODUCTION OF COCA LEAF AND MARIJUANA 1987 AND 1990). Until recently most of the process-
ing took place in Colombia, converting the leaf into coca base in preparation for shipment to its 
markets. In response to a crackdown on the drug cartels in Colombia, some of the production 
operations have been moved to Peru and Bolivia. See id. at 10-13. Thus, whenever operations are 
interrupted, new avenues are opened. See Don Podesta, Argentina Becomes Conduit for Drug 
Traffic, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1993, at 16. 
14 Former Drug Czar William Bennett said that much of the current drug problem can be 
explained in one word: "crack." OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL DRUG POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG 
CONTROL STRATEGY 3 (1989). For an official definition of the term "drug", see the Federal Food, 
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g) (I) (Supp. V 1993); "narcotic drug" is defined in the 
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(17) (1988). Three statutes have been relevant at the 
federal level for criminal enforcement of drug prohibition: The Harrison Narcotic Act, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4701 (1964) (repealed 1970); Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 
U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1988),42 U.s.C. § 257 et seq. (1988); Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (Supp. IV 1993). 
15 The vast amount of literature on the subject of drug policy has in itself become virtually 
a "cottage industry." See, e.g., THEODORE R. VALLANCE, PROHIBITION'S SECOND FAILURE 12-13 
(1993); THOMAS SZASZ, OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS 185-89 (1993); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 204-11 (1992). 
16 Arguments for legalization may be found in various scholarly works. See SZASZ, supra note 
15, at 104-07 (citing LESTER GRINSPOON, MARIHUANA RECONSIDERED (2nd ed. 1977)); see also 
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existing prohibition approach) will change that approach in the fore-
seeable future is remote.17 
The second section of the paper will seek to demonstrate the basis 
for the pessimistic conclusion that the United States will not change 
its prohibition policy any time in the near future. In this section 
evidence of the United States government's obdurate commitment to 
the prohibition policy and the considerable obstacles to any change in 
that policy will be explored. 
Although the paper joins those critics who have argued for de-
criminalization or legalization, the concluding section will not rehearse 
those arguments. Instead, the final section urges those who are ad-
versely affected by the prohibition policy to pursue avenues that will 
bring pressure on the United States to amend its prohibition stance. 
This argument is most particularly addressed to the governments of 
Latin American countries and to the populations who are the main 
victims of the present policy. 
II. HUMAN COSTS, ECONOMIC COSTS, AND THE THREAT TO 
DEMOCRACY 
Few would question the harm directly associated with heavy drug 
use. 18 The critical question, however, is whether prohibition reduces 
such use, and if so, how much. If drug abuse is largely attributable to 
personal inclinations or "weaknesses" that entrap so-called addictive 
personalities, or even if use is a function of social! economic despair, 
then prohibition, or for that matter decriminalization, may not sig-
nificantly affect the level of use. There is no way to determine, short 
of social experiment,19 what the long-term impact of decriminalization 
would be on the incidence of use. Does prohibition deter a significant 
percentage of potential users who would ultimately become addicts, 
"experimenters," or, at the most, casual users?20 "Turning crack into a 
ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION (1982); RICHARD MILLER, THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING 
DRUGS (1991). 
17 Some critics suggest that the United States will never overcome the harmful societal effects 
of drug use until it shifts to a treatment-based effort or to a policy of legalization, decriminaliza-
tion, or "medicalization"; therefore, there is little to gain by adding still one more argument for 
a strategy of legalization. See generally Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 
18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 501 (1990). 
18 Mark A.R. Kleiman & Aaron J. Saiger, Drug Legalization: The Importance of Asking the Right 
Question, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 527, 538 n.68 (1990). 
19 See id. at 544 n.98 (citing to one authority who suggests an experimentation period of drug 
legalization) . 
20 See Joseph L. Galiber, A Bill to Repeal Criminal Drug Laws: Replacing Prohibition with 
Regulation, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 831, 849 (1990). 
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regulated and legal commodity would separate economically motivated 
lawlessness from the demand for an inexpensive high,''21 but it is unclear 
what the impact of such regulation would be upon "consumption and 
... the death, damage, and crime caused by the drug itself. "22 
Inasmuch as this question is unanswerable, the only response may 
be another question: can the present harm associated with cocaine use 
get much worse?23 Two critics of decriminalization, Mark Kleiman and 
Aaron Saiger, argue that the answer to this question is "yes"-the harm 
could become far worse.24 
In essence, their argument rests on the nature of crack cocaine. 
These critics consider crack to be an inherently extremely harmful 
drug, with especially seductive and addictive qualities.25 Therefore, 
their argument proposes, the risk that the use of crack would become 
rapidly and irreversibly widespread, once legalized, outweighs any harms 
that may be linked exclusively to prohibition.26 This argument, based 
on a dire prediction that cannot be proven or disproven, can best be 
refuted by invoking the lessons of history. 
The history of an earlier cocaine epidemic in this country is 
instructive. According to a leading historian of drug use patterns in 
the United States, "the highest rate of addiction ... occurred in the 
1890s.''27 History reveals that in the absence of regulation, after a 
pattern of addiction has run its course, cocaine use will fall to socially 
tolerable limits.28 
The legal climate at the turn of the century, it should be recalled, 
strongly favored free market (laissez-faire) principles,29 backed by an 
21 Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 18, at 562-63. 
22 Id. at 563. The authors concede that" [tl he illegal crack-distribution industry would shrink, 
much to the relief of neighborhoods now held captive by street drug markets .... Removing the 
financial incentives the crack business offers youth would help restore families and schools." Id. 
23 But seeJOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983) (discussing 
the implications of legalization, and noting that new addicts might be created under such a 
program). 
24 See Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 18, at 564-65. This argument deserves special recognition 
because unlike many others "[ilt assigns neither peculiar moral status to liberty nor peculiar 
moral onus to intoxication." Id. at 538. In other words, it eschews polemics. 
25 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
26 Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 18, at 561-65; see also Legalization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and 
Feasibility, A Review of Recent Hearings, A RepUTt of the Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Contro~ 
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). 
27 David F. Musto, Patterns in U.S. Drug Abuse and Response, in DRUG POLICY IN THE 
AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 29, 31. 
28 Id. The equivalent to the 1890 rate would be 1.1 million addicts. Id. However, three quarters 
of a century after passage of The Harrison Act, regular cocaine users now number approximately 
5.8 million. VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 15. 
29 This was the heyday of "Lochnerism." See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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interpretation of federalism30 that severely limited central regulation 
of state "police power" measures. Thus, during this period there was 
minimal regulation of drug use, at either the state or federallevePl In 
1906, the most Congress could achieve in a regulatory vein was to 
require drug content labeling of "patent medicines."32 Nonetheless, by 
this time, drug use had already declined by one-third to one-half of its 
peak usage.33 What is noteworthy is that this decline occurred in the 
absence of government intervention.34 
A second and related argument, supporting the assertion that 
lifting the ban on cocaine may lead to more harm than good, is based 
on evidence that the repeal of alcohol prohibition led to an increase 
in alcohol consumption, and an increase in the baneful health conse-
quences of alcoholism.35 While that may be the case, it is significant 
that there have been no serious proposals calling for the re-introduc-
tion of alcohol prohibition. 
Lastly, Kleiman and Saiger note that crack differs from powdered 
cocaine, and from depressants like heroin and alcohol. "Crack did not 
become popular because it was illegal. It is popular because the de-
30 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 u.s. 251 (1918) (striking down, on grounds of 
federalism, federal legislation that sought to inhibit child labor). 
31 Musto, supra note 27, at 31. The Supreme Court's early "contortionist" struggles concern-
ing federal drug regulation make fascinating reading. See, e.g., United States v.Jin Fuey Moy, 241 
U.S. 394 (1916); Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919); United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 
86 (1919); Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925). 
32 Musto, supra note 27, at 32. 
33Id. 
34 See id. The experience with the legalization of marijuana, admittedly a less addictive 
substance, indicates that use may actually decline following legalization. ARNOLD S. TREBACH, THE 
GREAT DRUG WAR: RADICAL PROPOSALS THAT COULD MAKE AMERICA SAFE AGAIN 103 (1987). 
The decriminalization of marijuana in Oregon, California, and Maine in the 1970s resulted in 
no significant percentage of new users or an increase in the frequency of use. STEVEN WISOTSKY, 
BREAKING THE IMPASSE ON THE WAR ON DRUGS 215 (1986); see also Schmoke, supra note 17, at 
519; Galiber, supra note 20, at 850 n.93 (citation omitted) (noting that states which have decrimi-
nalized or substantially reduced penalties for marijuana use have recorded only a minimal effect 
on consumption). 
Additionally, the Dutch program of "moderated decriminalization" generally led to a stabi-
lization of drug use. There is no reason to believe that Holland would have moved back toward 
criminalization in recent years, but for mounting pressures from the European Community to 
recriminalize drug use. HenkJan van Vliet, The Uneasy Decriminalization: A Perspective on Dutch 
Drug Policy, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 717, 717-18 (1990). 
35 See Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 18, at 542 n.93 (citations omitted); see also Mark H. 
Moore, Actually Prohibition Was a Success, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1989, at A21. But see SEAN DENNIS 
CASHMAN, PROHIBITION: THE LIE OF THE LAND (1988) (noting the rise in alcohol consumption 
during the prohibition era). It must be noted, however, that alcohol prohibition was accompanied 
by a rise in the homicide and assault-by-firearm rates, and that repeal was followed by a steady 
decline in these rates. See David Boaz, A Drug-Free America-Or A Free America?, 24 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REv. 617, 618 n.8 (1991). 
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mand for the cheap, intense high that it provides is great, especially, 
perhaps, in poor, urban areas. "36 Whether these differences will cate-
gorically increase harm still remains in the realm of conjecture. But 
the reminiscent nature of this argument should cause skepticism. Again, 
history shows that opium derivative consumption grew greatly when it 
first became available, in the United States, in injectable and smoke-
able forms.37 But the use of these forms of opium eventually declined 
in the face of social opprobrium, long before prohibition was en-
acted.38 
Admitting that the harm arising from drug use, in and of itself, is 
terrible, and admitting that it is not possible to predict whether this 
harm will increase and spread as a result of legalization or decriminali-
zation, and even admitting that harm arising from use cannot be 
definitively isolated from the harm flowing from prohibition itself, 
does not relieve us from the effort to identity those harms that reason-
ably can be laid at the prohibition doorstep. 
A. The Human and Social Harms 
Referencing and cataloging the harms attributable to the crimi-
nalization of drug use is de rigeur for any study or work that addresses 
the reform of drug laws. Before bringing forth the cold statistics and 
lists, however, it is worth pausing a moment to note that one of the 
most insidious harms caused by the drug-war mentality has been the 
objectification and demonization of an entire class of fellow human 
beings.39 With the possible exception of babies born addicted,40 every-
one involved in the business of illicit drugs is made the object of 
contempt and vilification,4l If this objectification were not in itself bad 
enough, this stereotyping merges and seems indistinguishable from 
36 Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 18, at 563; see al50 Jefferson Morley, What Crack is Like: It's 
Great, Unfortunately, NEW REpUBLIC, Oct. 2, 1989, at 12-13. 
37 See Musto, supra note 27, at 30. 
38 See Boaz, supra note 35, at 618 n.10 (noting that drug use has ebbed and risen without 
correlation to the level of enforcement). 
39 See SZASZ, supra note 15, at 117. "Under the pretext of protecting people ... from 
dangerous drugs, America's young black males are stigmatized en masse as drug addicts and drug 
criminals." Id. 
40 See infra note 55. 
41 Professor Dwight Greene, in his foreword to the 1989 Symposium on Drug Decriminaliza-
tion at Hofstra University noted, "[d) rug users and sellers are the loved ones of parents, spouses, 
children, families and friends. They are not disconnected objects of someone else's policies. They 
are people who are part of other people." Dwight L. Greene, Foreword, Drug Decriminalization: 
A Chorus in Need of Masterrap's Voice, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 457, 489 (1990). 
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the more ancient and invidious forms of stereotyping: race, alienage, 
and class.42 
The images put forth by the media43 form and feed the public 
perception that the drug scourge in the United States can be blamed 
on inner-city Mrican Americans, Latinos, and Asians who do the work 
of the drug cartels of South America and Asia. Even if this image is in 
some sense accurate, rarely do the media or members of the general 
public try to go behind the superficial meaning of the image. For 
example, if, as statistics show, most consumers of cocaine in the United 
States are white,44 it is notable that journalists rarely question or explain 
the odd fact that most of the "drug busts," police raids, and arrests take 
place in the minority neighborhoods of U.S. cities.45 
Even if there were no cause for concern about the dangers of 
racial divisiveness that the drug war exacerbates, the policies and 
practices of that war are having real and devastating effects on inner-
city minority communities. We might dismiss as demagogic ranting the 
words of the Black Muslim minister Louis Farrakhan, suggesting that 
"under the guise of the drug war [the government] is planning a war 
against black youths. "46 But when scholarly observers reach a similar 
42 See SZASZ, supra note 15, at 117. "Clearly, one of the unintended consequences of drug 
prohibition-far more dangerous to American society than drugs-has been that it has fueled 
the fires of racial division and antagonism." Id. Carl T. Rowan, a well-known black columnist notes 
that the racial stereotypes fostered by the war on drugs have "crippled the minds of white 
Americans." SZASZ, supra note 15, at 116 n.ll (citing Carl T. Rowan, Wake Up White America: 
Stereotypes Fogging War on Drugs, SYRACUSE HERALD-]., Dec. 28, 1989). 
43 The popular press abounds with stories which, while appearing neutral, nourish the 
public's racist stereotypes of people engaged in the illegal drug trade. See, e.g., Seth Faison, Arrests 
in New York Are Said to Cripple A Huge Drug Gang, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1994, at Al (noting that 
the "gang-leader" arrested in this raid had entered the United States illegally, and was known in 
the Dominican Republic as "the Mayor," due to his "big spending ways"); see also Peter Maas, 
Danger from the East & The Menace of China White, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 18, 1994, Parade Supp. 
at 4 (discussing secret Chinese criminal societies based in Hong Kong called 'triads' which 
resemble Mafia crime families). 
44 Former drug czar William Bennett notes that "[t1he typical cocaine user is white, male, a 
high school graduate, employed full time, and living in a small metropolitan area or suburb." 
john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution 
and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 557, 610 (1991) (citation omitted). 
According to a National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) survey, 37.7% of whites report 
having ever used drugs, while 33.6% of Mrican Americans report such usage. NAT'L INSTITUTE 
ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG 
ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES 1992 20-21 (1993) [hereinafter NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
19921. Not only is the percentage of users who are Mrican-American lower, but when this figure 
is adjusted for the proportion of the U.S. population that is African-American, it becomes clear 
that many fewer African Americans use drugs-59,750,000 whites versus 7,941,000 African Ameri-
cans.Id. 
45 See Michael Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug 
Enforcement in New York City and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 795, 799 (1990). 
46 SZASZ, supra note 15, at 118 (citing L. Wright & D. Glick, Farrakhan Mission: Fighting the 
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conclusion-that "the war on drugs could more aptly be called a war 
on the minority populations"47-we must take notice.48 
Discrimination and racial prejudice are egregious wrongs, and 
alone would serve as sufficient ground for seeking other means of 
dealing with the nation's drug problem.49 Were there ways, however, of 
administering the prohibition laws without even the appearance of 
discrimination, the more ostensible harms committed in the name of 
the war on drugs would perdure. These too should be catalogued, even 
as in doing so we distance ourselves from the human stories and 
tragedies that fill this catalogue. Since this "bill of complaints" has been 
drawn up so often,50 it should suffice here to use the shorthand device 
of a listing, stopping to expand on a few observations in the accompa-
nying notes. Among other harms, the war on drugs has resulted in: 
Drug War-His Way, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 19, 1990 at 25); see also Cecil Williams, Crack is Genocide, 
1990s Style, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1990, atA31. 
47 powell & Hershenov, supra note 44, at 559. 
48 Statistics demonstrate the disparate effect that the war on drugs has had on minorities in 
the United States, as the following examples suggest: 
(1) Before the age of twenty-five, a black man is today more likely to die in the 
streets than a United States soldier was to perish in Vietnam or in the Persian Gulf 
War." (emphasis deleted). (2) Fully eighty to ninety percent of drug arrests nation-
wide involve Mrican-American males, despite the fact ... 'that blacks make up only 
12 percent of the nation's drug users.' (citation omitted). (3) Fully eighty-two 
percent of a population of 55,000 inmates in New York's state prisons are black or 
Latino .... [M]inorities now comprise ninety-five percent of New York City's jail 
population of approximately 20,000. (4) 'In Florida, state researchers predict that 
by 1994, nearly half of the black men in the 18-34 age group will be locked up or 
under court supervision.' (citation omitted). (5) [A]lthough substance abuse [is] 
equally prevalent among white and black women, a black woman who uses drugs 
or alcohol during pregnancy is almost ten times more likely to be reported to the 
state authorities than a white woman. 
Id. at 609-12. 
49 It clearly is the case that, at the very least, the war on drugs has had a disparate effect on 
the minority community and it may be time to demand that law enforcement officials, at whatever 
level the war against drugs is being waged, be made to account for and justifY their unequal 
administration of the law. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, U8 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). In Yick Wo, the 
Supreme Court said: 
though the law itself be fair on its face, ... yet, if it is applied and administered by 
public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make 
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, the 
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 
Id. Cf Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (noting 
that a zoning decision which bears more heavily on one race than another may provide an 
important starting point in determining whether race discrimination occurred); Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 479 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges to dismiss 
jurors on racial grounds constitutes a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination). 
50 See, e.g., VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 35-41; Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 647-55; Letwin, 
supra note 45, at 819-27; Schuler & McBride, supra note 2, at 901-09; Schmoke, supra note 17, 
at 512-18; powell & Hershenov, supra note 44, at 600-07. 
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(1) Increased violence;51 
(2) Increase in property crimes;52 
(3) Exploitation of and harm to women;53 
(4) Spread of AIDS and venereal disease;54 
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51 One estimate drawn in 1990 placed the drug related deaths associated with the prohibition 
regime at almost eight thousand. Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 655. Besides the killings directly 
related to black market activity, the territorial wars among rival gangs, the drive-by shootings, the 
shoot-outs with police, and murders of informants and witnesses, there are the less obvious 
"killings." These include the spread of AIDS through the sharing of infected needles, the unwilling-
ness or inability to seek medical assistance for fear of abuse detection, and the use of adulterated 
drugs, such as heroin, which are subject to no quality control. See Joseph Treaster & Lynette 
Holloway, Potent New Blend of Heroin Ends 8 Very Different Lives, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, at AI. 
But see Joseph Treaster, Officials Lower Death Total Attributed to Powerful Heroin, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
2, 1993, at B3 (discussing the exaggeration of deaths attributed to heroin). For a well-documented 
breakdown of the crimes directly related to drug prohibition, see Schuler & McBride, supra note 
2, at 901-09. 
52 It is estimated that at least 40% of all property crime in the United States is committed by 
drug users in order to maintain their expensive habits. This amounts to about 8 million crimes 
per year and $6 billion in stolen property. Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 647-48. 
53 See Letwin, supra note 45, at 812 & n.l06 (referring to the "sex for crack phenomenon" 
and citing Joseph W. Queen, Drugs Stimulate Spread of Prostitution, NEWS DAY, Sept. 19, 1988, at 
9). The strong anecdotal evidence of young women being forced into prostitution to help support 
the drug habits of male associates has inspired an "enslavement theory of addiction." See generally 
JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, COCAINE, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145-73 
(1986). Women are disproportionately the victims of violence and abuse in this, and probably 
every society. "NIDA studies showed that 70% of addicted women had been raped or molested 
prior to addiction. Another study showed that among street prostitutes, as many as 70% had been 
sexually abused as children and repeatedly raped as adults." Rod Mullen & Naya Arbiter, Against 
the Odds: Therapeutic Community Approaches to Underclass Drug Abuse, in DRUG POLICY IN THE 
AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 187. 
54Letwin, supra note 45, at 812. Reportedly "the barter by women of sex for crack in the 
inner-city has replaced dirty needles as the main reason for the increase in AIDS among drug 
users .... [It] has also led to the first syphilis epidemic in decades." Id. NIDA collected data in 
1987 which indicated that in states that prohibited the sale of clean needles, 31 % of drug users 
had the AIDS virus, while in states that allowed the non-prescription sale of hyperdermic needles, 
only 5% were infected. Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 637 nn.139-43 (citations omitted). "The NIDA 
study demonstrates that just one piece of prohibitionist legislation-the ban on over-the-counter 
needle sales-seems to be responsible for most drug related AIDS cases." Id. at 638. See also 
Nicholas D. Kristoff, Hong Kong Program: Addicts Without AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1987, at AI; 
VALLANCE, supra note 15, Appendix C at 149-51; Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the 
United States: Costs, Consequences and Alternatives, 245 SCIENCE 939 (1989); SZASZ, supra note 15, 
at 55 (asserting that 50% offresh AIDS cases in the United States are attributable to contaminated 
needles); Schmoke, supra note 17, at 517 (describing the refusal to adopt needle exchange 
programs as "a graphic example of our blind pursuit of an irrational policy"). For a recent 
confirmation of the efficacy of needle-exchange programs, see Felicia Lee, Data Shows Needle 
Exchange Curbs H.I. V. Among Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1994, at AI. 
There are many other health related problems associated with drug use, including the spread 
of venereal disease, and a rising incidence of drug-resistant tuberculosis. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, 
The Return of TB: A SPecial Report; Tuberculosis Germ Resurging As Risk to Public Health, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 1990, at AI; see also Andrew A. Skolnick, "Collateral Casualites" Climb in Drug War, 
271 J. AMER. MED. ASS'N 1636 (1994) (pointing out that, in addition to the high incidence of 
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(5) Exploitation of and harm to children;55 
(6) Undermining family integrity and authority;56 
communicable diseases among drug users, crowded prison conditions provide a breeding ground 
for the spread of the diseases within the prison population, and to the community after release). 
This also raises serious legal questions as to whether imprisonment that poses such heightened 
risk violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause or opens up the state to liability. Courts 
have held that overcrowding, when combined with unsanitary conditions, violates the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Tillery v. Owens, 907 
F.2d 418, 427-28 (3d Cir. 1990); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 566 (10th Cir. 1980). 
Some of the health problems, deaths, and illnesses caused by drug impurity, adulteration 
and uncertain potency, are clearly linked to the prohibition policy. See Ostrowski, supra note 4, 
at 652,693 nnA06-18 (pertaining to cocaine specifically). But seeThe Federal Food and Cosmetic 
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 331 (a) (1988) (prohibiting the movement in "interstate commerce of any ... 
drug ... that is adulterated or misbranded"). Other health problems, by contrast, cannot be so 
clearly linked, but there is no doubt that prohibition interferes with efforts to treat the health-
related aspects of drug use. For a thorough discussion of health implications, see powell & 
Hershenov, supra note 44, at 559 n.6, 600-07;jonas, supra note 9, at 751-59. 
55 See joe Sexton, Police, Youths and Toy Guns: 1 Hurt, 1 Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, 
AI. This headline poignantly describes the shootings by police officers of two boys, aged 13 and 
16, in separate incidents. In both cases the children were "armed" with replicas of weapons, and 
the officers mistakenly feared for their lives. 
The reason that police officers might reasonably fear armed children is that many children 
have been recruited into the drug trade, just as they were during the first bootlegging era. See E. 
L. DOCTOROW, BILLY BATHGATE (1989). This recruitment makes perfect business sense: children 
are subject to less severe criminal penalties than those that apply to adult criminals, children work 
cheaply, and children are generally obedient. Being drawn into very dangerous activity is only 
the most obvious form of harm these children suffer. The more pervasive harm is that these 
children are being robbed of their childhood. See e.g., Schmoke, supra note 17, at 515-16; Letwin, 
supra note 45, at 813-16; Kleiman & Saiger, supra note 18, at 527 n.5. 
The most telling response that opponents make against drug legalization is to raise the 
question of babies born drug-dependent. See e.g., J. Q. Wilson, Against the Legalization of Drugs, 
COMMENTARY, Feb. 1990, at 21. One proponent of legalization admits that this "[i]s the only 
probability that gives me any doubts about the case for legalization." David R. Henderson, A 
Humane Economist's Case for Drug Legalization, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 655, 674 (1991). The 
mothers of these infants are often children themselves. For the most part, they are not drug 
pushers or couriers. With this class of users, we are really dealing with two sets of minor-victims. 
In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the Court held that a law which criminalizes the 
illness of drug addiction violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause. To criminally punish 
an addictive mother for transmitting her condition to her fetus seems within the rationale of 
Robinson. jailing mothers does nothing for the addicted infants and only alienates the mother 
further from society. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 44, at 595-98, 612-13. Fear of prosecu-
tion discourages women from seeking prenatal care that might reduce fetal risk. Andrew A. 
Skolnick, 'Collateral Casualities' Climb in Drug War, 27IJ. AMER. MED. AsS'N 1636 (1994) (citation 
omitted). 
56 ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 74 
(1992). The majority of children in the inner·dty "ghettos" are brought up in single parent 
homes. In 1960, 11.5% offemale heads of households were never married, and by 1990 this figure 
had risen to 55.1 %. Considering the devastating effect that the drug wars have had on black men, 
this figure is not altogether remarkable. When these statistics are coupled with the high percent-
age of single mothers on welfare, in some states higher than 68%, the difficulties of providing a 
secure and sound upbringing are often insurmountable. fd. at 91. The absence of a strong male 
role model, especially for young boys lured into drug activity at early ages, weighs heavily against 
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(7) Housing dispossession;57 
(8) Drain on limited budgets;58 
(9) Disruption of education;59 and 
(10) Undermining community.60 
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the life chances of these children. How much authority can a woman exert over an adolescent 
boy who offers more to the family upkeep than the mother does herself? 
57 See infra note 111; see also Elizabeth Neuffer, Civil Rights at Issue in Fight Against Drugs; 
Seizures, Evictions Debated, BOSTON GLOBE, May 1, 1989, at Bl; Evicting the Drug Dealers; Kemp's 
Tough Action Raises Constitutional Questions, TIME, May 1, 1989, at 41. Tenants of public housing 
have challenged the constitutionality of the seizure of public housing. See Richmond Tenants 
Org. v.jack Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607 (1990). In Richmond Tenants, the district court enjoined the 
government from evicting tenants suspected of drug activity, except in "extraordinary situations;" 
these tenants' leaseholds had been seized by the government without prior notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. Id. at 608. 
58 Ellen Benoit, Drugs: The Case for Legalization, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 3, 1989, at 32. "Legalizing 
drugs does not mean condoning their abuse ... [it] would mean taking billions from valiant but 
wasted interdiction and law enforcement efforts and spending it instead on education and 
rehabilitation." Id.; see also Letwin, supra note 45, at 827 (specifying taxes and diversion of 
expenditures from other sources in New York City). Additionally, studies suggest that allocating 
part of the funding for the "war on drugs" to mental health treatment would be productive. See 
generally Darrell A. Regier et al., Comorbidity of Mental Disorders with Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse, 
264]. AM. MED. AsS'N 2511 (1990). It has been estimated that "treating cocaine abuse is seven 
times more cost-effective than other drug-fighting strategies." William Douglas, Best Weapon in 
Drug War is Treatment, NEWSDAY,june 14, 1994, at A15 (discussing recent Rand Corp. study). 
Finally, even if the funding currently spent on the drug war is not relinquished by enforce-
ment agencies, much of it could be applied to combat the many crimes "that are going uninves-
tigated, unprosecuted and unpunished because of the enormous effort being put into the war 
on drugs." Schmoke, supra note 17, at 514. 
59 See Sam Enriquez, L.A. Schools Report Sharp Rise in Guns and Assaults, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 
11,1990, at Bl; see also William Douglas, Drugs Dragging Students Doum in City Schools, Fast High, 
Fast Bucks Lure Kids to Crack, NEWSDAY, May 16, 1988, at 4. Compared to the deferred benefits 
of an education, life in the drug trade, with its immediate rewards and even thrills, is hard for 
children to resist. See powell & Hershenov, supra note 44, at 599--600. 
60 Though much has changed since the publication of the classic study of the condition of 
blacks in America, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, more has 
remained the same, and some conditions have worsened, particularly for the inner-city black 
community. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACY (1944). 
When the predominant "success models" in neighborhoods are drug dealers and pimps, "the 
credibility of teachers, police, and legitimate business people may be undermined in the eyes of 
the young, and the morale of conforming segments of the population may suffer." ZIMRING & 
HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 147-50; see also VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 36. The fear and anger 
that pervades the inner-city neighborhoods ravaged by drug activity is well known. Periodically, 
rage that is barely beneath the surface is turned against the police. See William Booth, Officer's 
Retrial Starts in Florida; Motorcyclist's Shooting sparked Miami Riots, WASH. POST, May 18, 1993, 
at A3; Mike Clary, Police in Miami Brace for Violence, Race Relations: Two Latino Officers Shoot and 
Wound a Black Man, The Incident Threathens to spark a New Round of Rioting, LA. TIMES, june 
29, 1991, at A16. More often the rage is turned inward, as the Los Angeles riots following the 
acquittal of the officers who beat Rodney King exemplified. See supra note 7 and accompanying 
text. 
One question that policy makers in the United States rarely ask is whether the extension of 
the war to the supply-side, beyond our borders and deep into the heart of other countries, is a 
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B. The Economic Costs of Prohibition 
When the end of the "cold war" was declared, there was a good 
deal of discussion concerning the peace dividend. A similar "domestic 
peace dividend" might be expected should the drug war also end.61 
The nature and extent of the economic costs of prohibition are such 
that the elimination or even the reduction of those costs would enor-
mously benefit all segments of society, with the exception of those 
presently involved in the drug enterprise. 
The most direct cost of prohibition is the expenditure by every 
level of government, in both the consuming and producing nations, 
to stem the flow of illicit drugs. The budget request for federal drug 
enforcement purposes was $13 billion in fiscal year 1995.62 Beyond that, 
"[tJrying to 'cost out' the national drug problem is a formidable 
task .... But ... it is absolutely necessary to make the effort."63 That 
effort, largely based on a five year study at the University ofCalifornia,64 
yielded the following estimates of costs: $11.063 billion for public 
expenditures;65 $1.381 billion for legal defense;66 $.759 billion for prop-
erty damage;67 $19.252 billion for indirect costs;68 and $.006 billion for 
social welfare administration.69 This adds up to a staggering $32.461 
billion dollar cost attributable to the war on drugs.7o 
legitimate exercise of national power. The elimination of coca leaf production probably cannot 
be achieved without destroying indigenous cultures. See William O. Walker, International Collabo-
ration in Histarical Perspective, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 278; see also 
infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
61 Of course, even a gradual cessation of the drug war almost certainly would be accompanied 
by short-term dislocations. 
62 See William Ruzzamenti, Column on U.S. Drug Policies Inflates Agenry Budget, ARIZ. REpUB-
LIC, Dec. 13, 1993, at B4 (Chief of Public Affairs Section of DEA, responding to Alexander 
Cockburn's column concerning the nation's drug policies, noting accuracy of$13 billion federal 
drug budget). 
63YALLANCE, supra note IS, at 28-29. 
64 Id. at 29. 
65 This consists mainly of the criminal justice system, police protection, and local, state, and 
federal corrections systems. Id. at 31, Table 2.2. 
66Id. 
67Id. 
68 Id. Indirect costs include losses suffered by victims of crime, non-productivity of incarcer-
ated violators, and the loss of productive contribution of lives spent in criminal activity. Id. 
Although this last category is the most controversial, it should be noted that many of the young 
people engaged in the drug trade may be among the most ambitious and inventive of their 
generation. See generally TERRY M. WILLIAMS, THE COCAINE KIDS: THE INSIDE STORY OF A TEENAGE 
DRUG RING (1989). 
69YALLANCE, supra note IS, at 31. This relatively small figure, compared to the amount 
expended on drug law enforcement, speaks volumes about the lopsidedness of the federal 
government's approach to the drug problem. 
70 See id. Another $10.624 billion was assigned to so-called "core costs" of drug use, which 
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These figures probably do not include expenses borne by other 
departments of the government which have been enlisted in the drug 
interdiction drive, expenses "involving the Coast Guard, the Depart-
ment of Defense, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the 
Customs Services."71 Nor do these figures include the costs undertaken 
by cooperating governments, particularly in Latin America, or the 
foreign aid that has been expended to induce that cooperation.72 One 
commentator has said: 
Wars are expensive, even if they exist only in myriad scattered 
episodes of drug busts, arrests, prosecutions, incarcerations, 
parole supervisions, publicity and rhetoric, rather than on 
traditional battlefields. This one including treatment, preven-
tion and research, seems to be costing at least $60 billion each 
year but is surely more than this, given the age of some of our 
cost figures. 73 
Given public costs of this magnitude, it is easy, in a discussion of 
costs, to lose sight of the economic distortion inherent in an artificially 
created black market. Prohibition, imposed upon a robust trade in a 
commodity, deprives the economy of a substantial source of revenue. 
This source of taxation extends far beyond the drug trafficker to 
include many peripheral activities that are conducted through untaxed 
cash transactions.74 What conceivable justification could there be for 
functionally exempting the enormous drug business from taxation?75 
Ironically, the perverse economic effect of prohibition is to push 
the price of drugs twenty times,76 or more,77 above what they might 
are related less clearly to prohibition, including treatment. support. AIDS, and the cost of 
drug-users arising from illness (morbidity) and premature death (mortality). Id. at 30, Table 2.1. 
71 Id. at 32. 
72Id. at 32, 34; see also infra note 134, addressing funds expended on coca eradication 
programs in the Andes. 
73 VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 34 (emphasis added). 
74 See infra notes 218-26 and accompanying text. 
75 Extrapolating from one generally accepted figure of$80 billion in annual illegal drug sales, 
one economist estimated that the government would collect $8 billion per year. This figure was 
based on the following assumptions: that prices would fall to one-tenth of the current price as a 
result of legalization, that the assessment of a 100% excise tax would be reasonable and would 
not provoke black market sales, and that the number of users would remain the same after 
legalization. See Henderson, supra note 55, at 664. 
76 See Wilson, supra note 55, at 22 (noting that had heroin been legalized, its price would 
have been about five percent of its current street price). 
77 An interesting comparison may be drawn between two Colombian exports: coffee and 
cocaine. The price of a pound of coffee on the retail market in late 1990 was about $2.40 per 
pound. At the time, the spot price was 89.5 cents per pound. The mark-up retail price was 
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command in a "normal" market. This enormous price rise, of course, 
is intended to drive the average user out of the market. This has not 
happened. Instead there has been a massive transfer of wealth from 
consumers, who are hard-pressed to afford it, to a few unscrupulous 
wealthy operators,78 with devastating consequences. The ripple effect 
of these consequences, particularly crime committed to support the 
users' always expensive drug habits, has spread the adverse economic 
effects to other segments of society.79 
We tend to associate the drug war with conservative politicians; it 
is recognized that the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George 
Bush pressed the war harder than previous ones. There are signs, 
however, that economic reality may be leading some conservative thinkers 
to part company from the mainstream conservative political response 
to the drug question.80 Conceivably, arguments emphasizing economic 
costs and exploring the implications of trade and monetary policy 
might force a re-evaluation of prohibition, where arguments founded 
therefore less than three times the spot price. In 1986, the price of a kilogram of cocaine was 
$3,000. By the time this kilogram moved through the series of mark-ups in its dangerous distri-
bution chain, it retailed on the street for $113,400-a multiple of 37.8 times the spot price. 
Interestingly, even this multiple is understated because the $3,000 spot market price of cocaine 
ready for export in Colombia already includes the heavy costs imposed by the Colombian 
authorities-either in the form of bribes or costs imposed as efforts to intercept the trade. 
Henderson, supra note 55, at 658 n.15. 
78 Organized crime is generally acknowledged to control the drug business, ranging from 
the infamous cartels of Colombia to the Mafia families and rising gangs throughout the cities of 
the United States. See, e.g., American Agenda: Chicago Gang Muscles Into Politics, I (ABC World 
News Tonight, Sept. 28, 1994); American Agenda: Chicago Gang Moves Into Politics, II (ABC World 
News Tonight, Sept. 29, 1994). An interesting insight into the takeover of the drug business by 
organized crime is noted by Henderson, supra note 55, at 661-62: 
Id. 
Before 1973, organized crime was not involved in the illegal drug business in New 
York. In 1973, ... governor Nelson Rockefeller pushed through a draconian drug 
law with mandatory prison sentences .... When the penalties for selling drugs were 
much lighter, more civilized dealers could survive in the market .... [O]rganized 
crime eventually came to dominate the drug trade because it was the only entity 
able to absorb the high costs of criminalization. 
79 For example, besides the obvious case of someone burglarized or robbed by an addict in 
need of a fix, consider the heavy penalties, reaching into the millions of dollars, that are levied 
by the Customs Service against shipping companies for shipment of illicit drugs discovered in 
containers aboard their container ships. See William E. Sheeline, Drugs in the Hold, FORTUNE, 
Feb. 13, 1989, at 12-16. 
80 See, e.g., William F. Buckley, N.Y. Bar QJi,estions Drug Prohibition, DAllAS MORNING NEWS, 
Oct. 1, 1994, at 29A (discussing failure of drug prosecution to deter use, noting lack of evidence 
that legalization would result in increase of consumption or violence); Milton Friedman, A War 
We're Losing. WALL ST.]', Mar. 7, 1991, at A14 (discussing high human cost of war on drugs); 
U.S. Judge Calls Drug War Failure, Urges Legalization, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1989, at A5; Milton 
Friedman, An open Letter to Bill Bennett, WALL ST.]', Sept. 7, 1989, at A14. 
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in human concerns81 or warnings concerning assaults on civil liberty 
and democratic values have fallen on deaf ears. 
C. Undermining Democracy, Civil Liberties, and Human Rights-At 
Home and Abroad 
In 1989 Milton Friedman wrote an open letter to William Bennett, 
the then "drug czar, "82 in which he said: 
Every friend of freedom . . . must be revolted . . . by the 
prospect of turning the United States into an armed camp, 
by the vision of jails filled with casual drug users and of an 
army of enforcers empowered to invade the liberty of citizens 
on slight evidence, a country in which shooting down uniden-
tified planes "on suspicion"83 ... is not the kind of United 
States that either you or I want to hand on to future genera-
tions.84 
One commentator, making reference to the same words, consid-
ered Mr. Friedman's jeremiad particularly apt.85 Mter all, "[t]hroug-
hout the history of the United States, the government has used the 
exigencies of war as an excuse to constrict the constitutional liberties 
of American citizens." Driven by the ''war propaganda" in the "meta-
phorical war" against drugs, the American people have been willing to 
"countenance all manner of civil liberties abuses. "86 Opinion polls have 
found that 52% of Americans believe "police should be able to search 
homes of suspected drug dealers without a warrant. "87 Indeed, former 
New York City Mayor Ed Koch proposed "strip-search[ing] everyone 
entering the United States from Latin America or Asia,"88 and former 
81 See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text. 
82 The official use of this appellation is in itself chilling. Why would a free society aspire to 
the tyrannical rule that the term "czar" connotes? See Greene, supra note 41, at 459 n.5. 
83 The reference is to the vote by the Senate, reversed the following day, in favor of a proposal 
to shoot down unidentified airplanes entering the United States as a means of curtailing drug 
trafficking. See Eric Weiner, In the War on Drugs, Planes are a Big Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1989, 
at D4. See also Michael K. Frisby, Panel Agrees to spend $450 Million for Military in War on Drugs, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 26, 1989, at 59; William G. Broad, Charting Drug Trade From the Skies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1989, at A6. 
84 Friedman, open Letter to Bill Bennett, supra note 80, at A14. 
85 Boaz, supra note 35, at 627. 
86 Id. at 626. 
87Id. at 626 n.58 (citing Morin, Many in Poll Say Bush Plan is Not Stringent Enough, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 8, 1989, at AI8). 
88 Id. at 627. 
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Los Angeles Police Chief Daryl Gates suggested we "shoot all drug 
users. "89 
Rhetoric aside, the evidence supports the charge that government 
anti-drug policies-at home and abroad90-grievously abridge civil lib-
erties and human rights. Beyond mere documentation, to which we 
become easily inured, a sampling of the erosion of rights and liberties 
may better demonstrate the scope and pervasiveness of the violations 
entailed. 
Possibly the earliest civil liberties "casualty" in the drug wars has 
been the Fourth Amendment.91 In K£r v. California,92 for example, the 
Supreme Court held that a warrantless, unannounced entry into a 
private dwelling place and the seizure of marijuana met probable cause 
89Id. (citing Stripling, Altered Tastes-Drug-Use Habits Are Changing, but the Future's Cloaked 
in Smoke, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 19, 1991 at Kl). 
90 Professor Peter Smith, Director of the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies at 
the University of California, San Diego, describes the effect of the "U.S.-sponsored drug wars" in 
Latin America in this fashion: 
[The] wars have altered society and politics in important and far-reaching ways. 
First, they have subjected the countries and peoples of Latin America to staggering 
levels of violence and intimidation. The human toll of anti-drug campaigns has 
been extremely high-not only in Colombia but also in Peru and Mexico. . . . 
Ominously, too, the ... campaigns have produced large-scale violations of human 
rights. 
Smith, supra note 10, at 14 (citing AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN MEXICO: A POLICY OF 
IMPUNITY (1990); AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE, THE "DRUG WAR" IN COLOMBIA: THE NE-
GLECTED TRAGEDY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1990». 
91 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution sets forth: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person and things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For evidence of this erosion of the Fourth Amendment, see SPECIAL 
COMM. ON CRIM.jUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, AMER. BAR AsS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, A 
REpORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN BAR ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED 
STATES, SOME MYTHS, SOME REALITIES, AND SOME QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 46 (1988) 
[hereinafter ABA REpORT] (finding "evidence that certain disregard for the Fourth Amendment, 
specifically in drug cases, may be an unavoidable by-product of a drug problem so pervasive that 
the police feel they sometimes must violate constitutional restraints in order to regain control of 
the streets"); VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 70 (noting that, in its examination of four drug cases 
during the 1990 term, the Supreme Court "showed a narrowing view of Fourth Amendment 
protections and a tendency to defer [to] law enforcement interests"). 
92 374 U.S. 23 (1963). This case is inconsistent with the general rule that the warrantless 
entry of private premises is presumptively unreasonable since it implicates the "interest in 
preserving the privacy and sanctity of the home." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588-89 (1980); 
if. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984) (holding that the police could not enter a 
home without a warrant to arrest a person whom the police had observed moments earlier driving 
as if intoxicated). Although K£r can be distinguished from Wel5h, one wonders whether the cases 
reflect a different reaction to alleged drug and alcohol abuse. 
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and reasonableness standards.93 In United States v. Ross,94 the Court 
departed from an earlier position that searches of closed containers 
and packages found in an automobile could not proceed without a 
warrant.95 Ross essentially placed the authority to determine probable 
cause in the hands of the police rather than in those of a magistrate.96 
"Procedural protections" of those accused of crimes have never 
enjoyed popular understanding or acceptance. In light of the anti-drug 
propaganda campaigns, the public support of procedural rights in this 
context has reached its nadir. It has been asserted that "the war on 
drugs [has] produced a political-legal context in which drug enforce-
ment constitutes an exception" to the fair and just application of the 
law.97 At some level, this attitude toward criminal procedural protec-
tions is understandable because most citizens, non-users of illicit drugs, 
cannot identifY with those who assert that the police have wrongly 
searched or seized them or their property. However, popular view-
points do not excuse the tendency of the courts to lower the constitu-
tional bulwarks. Perhaps more significantly, these viewpoints fail to 
explain the willingness of courts to countenance intrusions of privacy 
that most citizens would emphatically disavow. For example, the United 
States Supreme Court has found that customs agents who "reasonably 
suspect that [a] traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary 
canal" may subject the traveler to a prolonged and humiliating deten-
tion, which includes a rectal exam.98 The exposure to such violations 
is exacerbated by the fact that customs agents are empowered to act 
93 374 U.S. at 36-37. 
94 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
95 456 U.S. at 824-25; see also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428 (1981). But see New 
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (upholding search of passenger compartment of automobile, 
including closed containers, when police made lawful custodial arrest of occupants of automo-
bile). The exception to the warrantless search of an automobile itself has "drug" origins, arising 
in a case during the alcohol Prohibition era. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 146-48 
(1925). 
96 456 U.S. at 809. Two other exceptions to ordinary search and seizure protections were 
spawned in drug seizure circumstances. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 326 (1985) (search 
of student belongings); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 (1986) (aerial surveillance of 
suspected marijuana cultivation). 
97 Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging ''Drug Exception» to the Bill of Rights, 38 HAST-
INGS LJ. 889, 925-26 (1987). 
98 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985); cf. People v. Luna, 535 
N.E.2d 1305 (N.Y 1989) (upholding pat down of nervous, agitated individual arriving alone on 
flight originating from distant country believed to be major source of illegal narcotics). Montoya 
de Hernandez might be compared to the very different response the Supreme Court evinced more 
than forty years ago in Rochin v. California. See 342 u.s. 165, 172 (1952) (holding unanimously 
that pumping the stomach of a suspect accused of swallowing drugs violated the due process 
clause, because such methods "shock the conscience"). 
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on suspicions based upon "drug courier profiles. "99 Such profiles are 
notoriously overbroadloo and too often are drawn in terms of racial and 
ethnic characteristics. lOI 
In a related, arbitrary intrusion on privacy interests, the govern-
ment has imposed or encouraged broad-based workplace drug testing. 
In 1986, President Reagan issued an executive order creating a "drug-
free Federal workplace. "102 The first case to reach the Supreme Court, 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, involved the Federal 
Railroad Administration's implementation of urine and breath test 
regulations, and was limited to employees involved in accidents, inci-
dents, or breaches of safety rules.103 The Court held that safety consid-
erations presented a "special need" that made the program reasonable 
and therefore, on balance, the usual Fourth Amendment requirements 
of a warrant, probable cause, and individualized suspicion could be 
ignored. 104 The two dissenting Justices identified hysteria over drugs as 
the basis for this unprincipled departure from constitutional text.105 
If the identification of persons who had records indicating safety 
concerns justified this decision, there was no such limiting considera-
tion in the companion drug-testing case decided with Skinner. 106 Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedy, in their dissent in National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, took the Court to task for accepting the Custom 
99 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. I, 10 (1989). 
100In his dissent in Sokolow, Justice Marshall warned: "[rJeflexive reliance on a profile ... 
runs a far greater risk than does ordinary, case-by-case police work of subjecting innocent 
individuals to unwarranted police harassment and detention." Id. at 13. 
101 See United States v. Montilla, 733 F. Supp. 579, 580 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting that eighty 
warrantless stops and searches, based upon drug profiles, yield three to four arrests per month); 
see also Lisa Belkin, Airp(fft Drug EffMts Snaring Innocents Who Fit 'Profiles' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
1990, at AI; powell & Hershenov, supra note 44, at 613. 
102 Executive Order No. 12,564,51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at B50. 
103 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
104 See id. at 619, 634. 
105 See id. at 654-55. 
106 See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); see also Harmon 
v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
Harmon and Hartness both involved drug-testing in the context of national security clearances. 
National security claims historically constitute the most potent basis for overriding constitutional 
norms. See e.g., United States v. Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683,706,710-11 (1974) (upholding a subpoena of confidential presidential records "[a]bsent a 
claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets .... "). When 
national security interests are joined with the need to fight drug use, there can be little doubt 
about the fate of constitutional arguments. Indeed, in Hartness, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that random drug testing in the context of national security clearances were per se reason-
able. See 919 F.2d at 173-74; see generally STEPHEN Dycus, ARTHUR L. BERNEY ET AL, NATIONAL 
SECURITY LAw, 523-25 (1990). 
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Service's program solely on the basis of speculation, without any show-
ing of harm or the likelihood of harm.107 
In addition to assaults on privacy interests, the drug war has 
advanced into the hitherto sacrosanct domain of property rights. lOB In 
one study concerning the impact of the drug war on minority commu-
nities,l09 the authors devote six pages to property forfeiture laws passed 
by Congress and various state legislatures in the last decadeYo 
In an exercise of '~udicial discretion," Judge Jack Weinstein of the 
District Court of New York summed up the violence done to family 
structure by the forfeiture rules as follows: 
For the poor, the shortage of livable, low-priced housing is 
especially acute. Tenants-and especially their minor chil-
dren-who are evicted are likely to become homeless, with 
whatever stability their lives afforded seriously jeopardized .... 
[T]he owner of the defendant leasehold is entitled to retain 
her home. Her children, grandchildren and great-grandchil-
dren, who look to her for shelter as the family's matriarch, 
may not be dispossessed because one of them has sold drugs 
from their apartment.Ill 
Beyond this summary of civil liberty infractions involving the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendmentll2 (or their manifestations under the Fourteenth 
107 See 489 U.S. at 681. The dissenters were disturbed by the failure of the government to 
base its rules on any findings. This failure may reflect the fact that scientific studies have not 
demonstrated any causal connection between low levels of drug use and job performance. See, 
e.g., powell & Hershenov, supra note 44, at 585 n.113 (citing Craig Zwerling, James Ryan & John 
Endel Orav, The Efficacy of Preemployment Drug Screening for Marijuana and Cocaine in Predicting 
Employment Outcome, 264]. AM. MED. AsS'N 2639 (1990) and Eric D. Wish, Preemployment Drug 
Screening, 264]. AM. MED. AsS'N 2672 (1990)). 
One of the inconsistencies in the government's promotion of employee drug screening 
programs is that while the government claims that drug use reduces productivity and is debilitat-
ing, it admits that these consequences can not be detected without scientific screening. 
108 See PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 
106 (1992) ("of Uohn Locke's] three basic rights of individuals-'life, liberty, and estate'-the 
last was most fundamental"). 
109 powell & Hershenov, supra note 44, at 588-95. 
1I0Id. at 589 n.128 (citing the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 
21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7) (1988) as amended). The study makes the following remarkable findings, 
supported by statutory and judicial references: (1) statutory provisions call for seizure of property 
only from those accused of a drug crime; (2) seizures take place before there has been a judicial 
determination of guilt or innocence; and (3) civil forfeiture can be effected even when no 
criminal charges are ever lodged or when they are later dropped. See id. at 588-89 (citations 
omitted). 
III See id. at 594 n.147 (citing United States v. Leashold Interest in 121 Norstrand Ave., No. 
90 Civ. 1607 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1991), a decision concerning an eviction from public housing). 
112 In addition to infractions previously noted, the drug testing laws and laws imposing a tax 
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Amendment), lies another field of indirect, subtle, and systemic inju-
ries to democratic processes and protected rights. Among these are: 
the numerous instances of unequal application of the law;ll3 disparate 
sentencing under inflexible penalty guidelines;1l4 growing police bru-
on illegal drugs raise Fifth Amendment, self-incrimination issues. Cf Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757 (1966). 
113 See powell & Hershenov, supra note 44. A particularly absurd example of the inequalities 
of our drug laws is Chapman v. United States, in which defendants convicted of selling ten sheets 
of blotter paper laced with LSD were given the mandatory sentence of five years for selling more 
than a gram of a mixture containing LSD, despite the fact that a major wholesaler caught with 
thousands of doses of pure LSD, weighing less than a gram absent the blotter paper, would not 
be subject to the mandatory minimum. 500 U.S. 453, 461-64 (1991). The Court concluded that 
this result was not irrational. Id. 
In Empluyment Division v. Smith, two Native Americans were dismissed from their jobs at a 
drug rehabilitation center for having smoked peyote in a tribal religious ritual. 494 U.s. 872, 874 
(1990). The state denied them unemployment compensation on the ground that using peyote 
was work-related misconduct and thus the dismissal was justified. Id. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the state denial. Id. at 890. Justice Blackmun, dissenting on the First Amendment issue, 
noted in passing that during the Prohibition era the ritual use of wine was exempted. Id. at 913 
n.6. 
114The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, Title 2, 
Oct. 12, 1984, was amended in 1986 to provide minimum penalties for possession with intent to 
distribute powder or crack cocaine. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, 
Title I, § 1005, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). The amendment provides 
that the possession of one hundred times the amount of powdered cocaine carries the same 
penalty as the possession of crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). 
This statute, as applied, disproportionately affects African-American cocaine users. African 
Americans tend to use crack more often, while powdered cocaine is used mainly by whites. See 
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 1992, supra note 44, at 32-33, 38-39 (showing that 1l.8% of 
whites report using cocaine compared to 8.6% of blacks, while 1.2% of whites report having used 
crack compared with 2.5% of blacks); see also Minnesota v. Russell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 887 n.l 
(Minn. 1991) (en banc) (noting that in 1988, 96.6% of all persons charged with possession of 
crack cocaine in Minnesota were African-American, while 79.6% of all persons charged with 
possession of powder cocaine were white); United States v. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 
1992) (noting that 97% of those prosecuted for crack offenses in the Western District of Missouri 
between 1988 and 1989 were African-American). 
This disparate sentencing of crack users versus powder cocaine users, in turn, has had a 
disparate impact on those in poorer black communities. Marcia G. Shein, Racial Disparity in 
"Crack" Cocaine Sentencing, 8 CRIM. JUST. 28, 29 (1993). As a consequence, the percentage of 
blacks in local jails nationwide charged with drug offenses rose from 34.6% to 48.3% between 
1983 and 1989. CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS AND JAIL INMATES, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REpORT 2 (1989). 
In United States v. GaUoway, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the sentencing provision of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b) (1) (A) (iii) (crack cocaine) despite noting that all 
of the nineteen defendants were African-American. 951 F.2d 64, 65 n.l (5th Cir. 1992). The court 
reasoned that the sentencing guidelines did not violate African-American defendants' rights to 
due process or equal protection as the preparation of crack cocaine made it more potent and 
this justified the disparate sentencing. Id. at 65. But see Russell, 477 N.W.2d at 888-89 (striking 
down similar state sentencing statute, as it violated the equal protection provisions of the Minne-
sota constitution). 
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tality1l5 and corruption;1l6 overcrowding in and the appalling condi-
tions of jails;l17 and the overwhelming of the criminal justice system.ns 
The cumulative effect of these ravages upon the delicate reticulation 
of civil liberties, painstakingly stitched over the centuries into the fabric 
of a free society,ll9 may be nothing short of devastating. One author's 
prediction of a coming "new conservatism, along 'Latin American 
115 See Lelwin, supra note 45, at 819--21; powell & Hershenov, supra note 44, at 614. 
116 See ABA REpORT, supra note 91, at 47 (stating "[b]ribery, even complicity, in [drug] 
trafficking by law enforcement officials or lawyers and judges is inevitable") This prediction has 
been confirmed recently in revelations of the extensive drug-related police corruption reported 
in New York City. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, 14 More Officers ATTested at a Shaken 30th Precinct, N.Y. 
TiMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at AI; Malcolm Gladwell, In Drug War, Crime Sometimes Wear.s a Badge: 
New York's Latest Police Scandal Reflects Growing Temptations Facing Officers, WASH. POST, May 19, 
1994, at AI; William K. Rashbaum, 11 More 'Dirty 30' Cops Lose Badges, NEWSDAY, May 5, 1994, 
at A30; see also Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 663-64 ("Drug corruption charges have been leveled 
against FBI agents, policemen, prison guards, U.S. Custom inspectors, even prosecutors"); Daniel 
Egler, Ex-Pontiac Official Indicted on New Prison Drug Charges, CHI. TIuB., july 29, 1988, at 3. 
Bribery, payoffs, thefts of confiscated property, and suborning witnesses are time-worn forms 
of corruption. Another less recognized source of corruption is the pressure on police to produce. 
For example, a former police chief points out that "pressure to produce 'good cases' [has] 
resulted in flaking [planting evidence], dropsy [affixing possession of dropped drugs indiscrimi-
nately], peIjury, entrapment and framing, by cops anxious to please demanding superiors." 
Lelwin, supra note 45, at 822 (citation omitted); see also id. at 816-27 (offering in-<lepth, unflattering 
description of the administration of New York City's criminal justice system). 
1I7In 1991, 14,564 of 34,648 of the new court commitments to federal prisons were for drug 
offenses. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK, 1993633 (1994). 
In 1993,59.5% offederal prisoners were committed for a drug offense. Id. at 630. This statistic 
is particularly disturbing considering the overcrowding of prisons, already at crisis levels. See U.S. 
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1991 11, Table 2.8 (1993) (specifying that in 1991, 136 jurisidictions were under court 
order to reduce population). See generally Schuler & McBride, supra note 2, at 917 & nn.87-89 
(discussing the interrelation of drug use convictions and prison overcrowding). Despite the 
overcrowding of prisons, the Supreme Court has not found double-celling unconstitutional. See 
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-52 (1991) ("double celling"-housing two individuals in 
one-person cell-does not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text, describing the spread of disease 
within prisons. 
According to recent reports, the prison overcrowding prediction has proven correct. The 
prison population surpassed one million inmates in the summer of 1994, equivalent to nearly 
1,500 new prisoners a week. E.g., Steven A. Holmes, Ranks of Inmates Reach One Million in a 
2-Decade Rise, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at AI. 
llS See Katherine Bishop, Mandatory Sentences in Drug Cases: Is the Law Defeating Its Purpose 7, 
N.Y. TIMES, june 8, 1990, at B16 (discussing judges' concern that surge in drug cases is over-
whelming federal courts). 
ll9 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, j., dissenting) 
("[if] the Government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of justice the 
end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this 
Court should resolutely set its face"); see also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1960) (Frankfurter, 
j., concurring) ("not the least significant test of the quality of a civilization is its treatment of 
those charged with crime, particularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a community"). 
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lines' employing repressive, police-state tactics,"120 cannot be lightly 
dismissed. As evidence, consider the following proposals offered by 
some of our leaders and opinion makers: establishing large internment 
camps for drug offenders; using federal troops to break the back of 
Washington, D.C.'s lucrative drug racket; using troops along United 
States borders for interdiction; and defoliating source countries. 121 
Some of these ideas can be dismissed as outrageous, but the proposed 
use of military force, since it has already been tried to a limited degree, 
cannot be ignored in any final assessment of the threat to civil liberties 
posed by prohibition policy.122 
One of the most common menaces to democratic rule is that 
posed by military usurpation of power. No Latin American democrat 
needs to be reminded of this truism. The United States has fortunately 
remained almost totally immune to this anti-democratic virus. Our 
founders, however, were acutely aware of the threat, and many clauses 
of the United States Constitution address the containment of the 
military. 123 As long ago as 1878, when concerns about the utilization of 
the army to enforce civil order were heightened in the aftermath of 
the Civil War,124 the dangers of using the military to enforce the crimi-
nal law were recognized by Congress with the passage of the Posse 
Comitatus Act.125 This act remained intact for more than one hundred 
years.126 However, anti-drug paranoia in the early 1980s led Congress 
120Jason DeParle, Daring &search or 'Social Science Pornography,' N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 9, 
1994, at 48,50 (profiling Charles Murray, co-author of THE BELL CURVE). 
121 See Schuler & McBride, supra note 2, at 896-97 & n.19 (describing the increased number 
of police, prosecutors, and judges, and longer sentences for drug offenders). 
122 See, e.g., Bruce H. Bagley, Myths of Militarization: Enlisting Armed Forces in the War on 
Drugs, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 140-'U; Guy Gugliotta, The Colombia 
Cartels and How to Stop Them, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 121-22. 
123For example, the Second Amendment pertains to the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms and has generally been interpreted as an effort to retain power in a "well regulated 
militia" made up of the people of the various states, as a counter-weight to a federal standing 
army. U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of troops during 
peace in the homes of the people without consent. U.S. CONST. amend. III; see also U.S. CONST., 
art. I, §8, c1.12 (limiting appropriations for a standing army to a period no longer than two years); 
cl. 15 (vesting in Congress the power to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the nation). 
In the rare event that the military has been called upon to restore civil order, its use has been 
subjected to severe limits and criticism. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). 
124 See Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (setting forth the limits on military 
criminal jurisdiction). 
125 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1988) (prohibiting the use of the Army or Air Force to execute the 
laws, except under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Congress). 
126Until the passage of drug-related legislation, the exceptions to this Act all pertained to 
the use of federal armed forces to help put down rebellions, insurrections, or to enforce federal 
law in the face of open resistance. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-35 (1988). The President has used 
troops in some questionable circumstances, but always under a colorable claim of maintaining 
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to amend the Act, so as to allow the involvement of the military in 
civilian law enforcement of criminal law.127 This has led to the use of 
the National Guard in Puerto Rico to "police" housing projects against 
drug activities, and to similar calls for military involvement by the 
mayor of Washington D.C.128 
Of course, if the military poses a threat to civilian control and 
republican governance in the United States, the threat is remote as 
compared to that posed by heightened military intervention in Latin 
America, with its long history of military coups and seizures of govern-
ment. Nevertheless, in pursuit of its drug policies, the United States 
has made common cause with the military in various countries in the 
Andean and Caribbean regions, and has even deployed forces in largely 
futile efforts to interdict the drug trade,129 thereby placing both civil-
ians and democratic governments at immediate risk.130 
A good example of this is a series of military support operations 
in the Caribbean in the early 1980s, which led to dubious claims of 
success in interdicting drugs,l3l while also leading the United States to 
attempt a more serious military intervention in Bolivia in 1986. This 
action, known as "Operation Blast Furnace," revealed the futility of 
such efforts.132 It also demonstrated the potential for disastrous politi-
cal consequences of similar actions. Although the plan successfully 
disrupted cocaine processing operations for a short time, it had no 
discernible impact on either the price or the availability of cocaine in 
the United States. It did, however, cause havoc in Bolivia: 
order. See, e.g., Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, a/I'd 800 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), 
affd 485 U.S. 264 (1988). For a general discussion, see Dycus, BERNEY ET AL, supra note 106, at 
427-30. 
127 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-80 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense to 
provide equipment and personnel to assist civilian agencies in the enforcement of drug, immi-
gration and tariff laws). The statute expressly forbids "direct participation" by members of the 
armed forces "in a search and seizure, an arrest, or other similar activity unless ... otherwise 
authorized by law." Id. at § 375. For a case charging a violation of the law and seeking damages, 
see Drug Policy Foundation v. Bennett, No. e90-2278 FMS (N.D. Cal. 1991) (unpublished 
opinion on file with the Boston College Third World Law Journal). See also Bagley, supra note 122, 
at 130-33. In 1989, Congress further expanded the involvement of the Department of Defense. 
Id. at 137. 
128 See Larry Rohter, National Guard Joins Puerto Rico Police on Beat as Crime Rises, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 28,1993, atAI0; see also Art Buchwald, Guarding the Home Front, WASH. POST, Oct. 29, 1993, 
at Fl. 
129 See Gugliotta, supra note 122, at 120-22. 
130 See Walker, supra note 60, at 272-73 (describing the contentious U.S. efforts to intercept 
drug production and traffic in Mexico); see also infra note 177. 
131 Bagley, supra note 122, at 135. 
132Id. 
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Mass protests against V.S. troop presence in Bolivia occurred 
in the rural zones ... and in urban centers throughout the 
country. President Paz Estensorro was vilified by his domestic 
critics ... and barely escaped impeachment proceedings .... 
[H] is administration was virtually paralyzed by intense politi-
cal opposition [and] harsh nationalist criticism long after 
V.S. forces had left. In light of the severe political fallout, ... 
Operation Blast Furnace was unquestionably a diplomatic 
failure. 133 
45 
Comparatively speaking, however, the Bolivian experience is a 
cautionary tale. In both Peru and Colombia, V.S. pressure134 to deal 
with the cocaine business as a national security threat exacerbated 
internal political problems, and trapped the people of these nations 
between violent militaristic forces, revolutionary groups, drug cartels, 
and the armed forces of the government.135 In Peru, the government 
was faced with an alliance between campesinos (peasants) and the 
Sendero Luminoso,136 which led it to reject, as part of the problem, 
Washington's call for broadening the role of the Peruvian armed forces 
in the anti-drug campaign. 137 The government concluded that without 
"resources to offer real alternatives to coca-dependent farmers" the 
rural poor would be driven into the ranks of the rebels.138 President 
133Id. at 136. The author of this report concludes that high-profile U.S. military involvement 
in drug interdiction in Latin America is controversial, unsustainable, and politically counterpro-
ductive. Id. 
134 See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Colombian Leader is Hailed by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1991, at 
A8 (describing the $20 million in economic aid in the Andean Trade Preference Act to improve 
trade and cooperation in law enforcement with Colombia); James Brooke, Peru, Its U.S. Aid 
Imperiled, Plots a New Drug Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1991, at A2 (reporting that Peru's aid 
was imperiled as its coca bush cultivation had increased 25% in the last three years despite 
millions of dollars in American aid); Brooke, supra note 8, at A12 (detailing President Bush's 
ordering of $65 million in aid to Colombia after the assassination of a presidential candidate by 
drug traffickers, as well as his "Andean Strategy" to provide $90 million in military and economic 
aid for Colombia, $97.5 million for Bolivia, and $73.4 million for Peru to help combat drug 
traffickers); Dowd, supra note 8, at 1. 
135 See Walker, supra note 60, at 275. 
136The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) is a radical leftist revolutionary movement in Peru. 
For a brief history of the Sendero Luminoso and its alliance with the peasant class, see Jeffrey D. 
Thielma, Note, Peru's Failure to Make the Military Subservient to Civilian Law: The Absence of 
Prosecution After the 1988 Cayara Massacre, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 433, 444-46 (1992). 
137 See Bagley, supra note 122, at 140-41. Paradoxically, another danger that the use of 
military force poses for democracy is that it is often popular. See James Brooke, Use of Army to 
Fight Crime in Rio Makes Many Feel Safer in Streets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1994, at AI. 
138 Bagley, supra note 122, at 140-41; see also Mathea Falco, Policies and Prospects for Demand 
Reduction, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 219-20. Another cost of the 
militarization of the anti-drug undertaking-corruption-was posited as the reason for the 
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Alberto Fujimori believed that to follow the course pressed by the 
United States would undermine the legitimacy of his government and 
the stability of Peru's fragile democratic regime.139 
Although democratic governance has been maintained in Colom-
bia, it has been marked by severe repressive measures and violence,14O 
including the bombing of the Colombian Supreme Court and the 
murders of Justice Department officials and journalists.I41 This led to 
a series of "battles" between the government and the drug cartels, 
characterized at various stages by murderous police and army raids, 
random bombings by gang members, kidnappings, and a general pe-
riod of terrorism.142 A key factor in this decade-long internal war in 
Colombia was the dispute over extradition of cartel leaders, action the 
United States insisted upon as a cornerstone of its drug war policies.143 
At one point, the Colombian president decided by executive fiat to 
extradite drug suspects,l44 a decision that led to a series of on-and-off 
negotiations with the Medellin cartel, further undermining the credi-
bility of the Colombian government. Assuming that these U.s.-driven 
initiatives have successfully damaged the Medellin cartel,145 the costs to 
Colombia have been unbearably high. 146 As Professor Peter Smith stated: 
suspension of Drug Enforcement Agency's collaboration with the Peruvian police. Military officials 
were allegedly discovered selling information about raids to drug traffickers. Walker, supra note 
60, at 266. For an extended and interesting discussion of corruption as a concomitant of prohibition, 
see MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION 111-38 (1991). 
139Bagley, supra note 122, at 140-41. This assessment was partially borne out soon afterward, 
when President Fujimori declared a state of emergency and suspended the constitution and the 
parliament of Peru. Peru's Leader Dissolves Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1992, at AS. 
140 See Francisco E. Thoumi, The Economic Impact of Narcotics in Colombia, in DRUG POllCY 
IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 58. It is unclear whether all costs of the violence are intrinsic 
to the drug enterprise or whether they are attributable to the illegality of the activity. Most analysts 
believe the latter is true. If the government is involved in the escalation of violence, then this last 
point is hard to refute. Id. 
141 RILEY, supra note 1, passim; see also Gugliotta, supra note 122, at 113, 115. 
142 See Gugliotta, supra note 122, at 112-16, 122-28. 
143 The Medellin cartel actually dubbed itself the "Extraditables." See id. at 113. 
144 See id. at 124. This questionable legal move was ultimately upheld by the Colombian 
Supreme Court. Id. 
145 For several reasons the gains are short-lived or illusory. Every setback the Medellin cartel 
has suffered has been accompanied by a reciprocal gain by Cali, the other large Colombian cartel. 
Id. at 126. Moreover, there are so many independent traffickers that it is doubtful that if the 
cartels were eliminated it would make a difference in the drug flow. See id. at 112. 
146The series of crackdowns following presumed cartel assassinations of Colombian officials 
and other direct attacks on the government were, in the words of one journalist who has studied 
the situation, "a waste of time. Not only did it not produce results, but it allowed the traffickers 
to flout the justice system and call into question the government's ability to govern." Gugliotta, 
supra note 122, at 123-24. 
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[P] rosecution of the drug wars [as presently conceived], places 
increasing autonomy and authority in the hands of Latin 
American armed forces. To put it bluntly, drug wars encour-
age militarization. This can pose a substantial threat to still-
fragile democracies ... and alter the political course of the 
region as a whole.147 
47 
Perhaps the most telling indictment of U.S. policy was delivered by 
Iban de Rementerla of the Comision Andina de Juristas: "Argentina 
and Brazil can see their future in Bolivia. Bolivia sees its own [fu-
ture] in Peru, Peru in Colombia and Colombia in Lebanon."l48 
III. GOVERNMENT WILL NOT CHANGE PROHIBITION POLICY 
This section of the paper suggests and considers what the real 
obstacles to change in United States or Latin American drug policies 
may be.149 Among these obstacles are strong congeries of cultural 
grounds, including religious, moral, psychological, and social attitudes. 
To a significant extent, these obstacles relate to matters of racism and 
class bias that prevail in the United States, as well as in most other 
countries.l50 Regardless of whether these cultural and prejudicial grounds 
are primary, or derivative of some other basis for maintaining the status 
quo, presumably determined and courageous leadership151 could over-
come them. That cannot be said as confidently, perhaps, with respect 
to the dominant reason for maintaining the status quo: the economic 
interests of many powerful and allied entities. 
In the second part of this discussion of the obstacles to change, 
two forms of inconsistent responses are reviewed in order to further 
demonstrate that drug prohibition policy is not rationally based. These 
two forms of behavior-(l) the half-hearted enforcement of money 
laundering activity, and (2) the treatment oflegal drugs-reinforce the 
147Smith, supra note 10, at 15. 
148 Id. at 13 (quoting member of the Andean Commission of Jurists). 
149 In the larger picture, this discussion would include the other coca-producing regions, 
Mexico and other marijuana-producing countries in this hemisphere, and the opium-producing 
regions of Asia and the Near East. However, since the focus is cocaine, the discussion is limited 
essentially to the United States, by far the greatest market for cocaine, and the producing 
countries of South America. Because the United States has made its drug policy a central element 
in its foreign policy as it concerns Latin America, the focus in this section will be mainly on the 
obstacles to change in the United States. 
150 See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. A particularly vicious form of class-related 
violence has emerged in Colombia. Vigilantes in Colombia Kill Hundreds in a 'Social Cleansing: 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1994, at A8. 
151 See infra notes 258-60 and accompanying text. Dedicated leadership led to the abolition 
48 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:19 
conclusion that economic constraints drive the current policy and 
inhibit its reform. These constraints reflect the interests of two important 
indigenous industries: the financial industry and the legal drug industry. 
A. Obstacles to Change of Prohibition Policy 
Why would the United States, with the intermittent cooperation 
of Latin American governments, pursue for so long a drug policy that 
is fraught with dangers to democracy at home and abroad, and at the 
same time appears to worsen the living conditions of those segments 
of society which are the most powerless and destitute? The answer to 
that question is not to be found wholly in rational drug policy expla-
nation. Instead, it derives from an understanding of political and 
cultural underpinnings of the drug prohibition policy. One need not 
subscribe to a conspiracy theory to recognize that policy makers are 
capable of exploiting fears and prejudices to sustain themselves in 
power, and to avoid the real problems that may confront the nation. 
This is particularly so when the problems, like poverty and chronic 
underemployment, seem intractable. Thus, the first basis for the asser-
tion that the United States drug policy will not change is that it is 
contrary to the political interests of our elected officials. 152 
1. The Politics of Prohibition 
In the simplest terms, only the bravest or most foolhardy politi-
cians, whatever their private opinions, would endorse a shift in drug 
policy in the face of public opinion polls that consistently identify 
crime and its association with drug trafficking at or near the top of the 
public's fears.153 Even the most impacted populations, inner-city minor-
ity neighborhoods, favor stricter enforcement of drug laws.154 When 
former Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders suggested in 1993 that it 
might be appropriate to commission a study of our current prohibition 
policy, the political reaction from the White House and Republican 
of an even more imbedded social evil in the past. Racial slavery was abolished in the 19th century, 
with many of the Latin American states taking the lead. Argentina abolished slavery in 1813, 
Colombia in 1821, and Mexico in 1829, all without recourse to war. Laws against racial and 
kindred forms of discrimination have evolved steadily, if erratically, throughout the nations of 
the western hemisphere. 
152 See Matthew O. Howard, Modem "War on Drugs" is Supported by Elemental Untruths, 
SEATTLE TIMES, May 2, 1990, at A9 (Lewis Lapham, Editor of Harper's magazine, states, "the war 
on drugs thus becomes the perfect war for people who would rather not fight a war"). 
15S See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
154SZASZ, supra note 15, at 117 (claiming blacks "enthusiastically [support] the War on 
Drugs") (citation omitted); see also Letwin, supra note 45, at 828 n.169. 
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lawmakers was furious. 155 Within twenty-four hours the Clinton Admini-
stration disavowed any such idea. 156 
Even as President Clinton struggled to wrest the "tough on crime" 
mantle from the Republican Party with the Crime Bill of 1994,157 members 
of the Republican opposition attacked the "prevention" provisions158 
in the Bill as "coddling criminals" or little more than "pork. "159 Presi-
dent Clinton must have spoken tongue-in-cheek when he said at the 
signing ceremonies, "[n] ever again should Washington put politics and 
party above law and order. "160 
The phrase "law and order" has increasingly taken on dark over-
tones in the American political lexicon. When mainstream politicians 
in the United States approach the dangerous fault line of race161 for 
political gain, they court catastrophe. If our leaders are willing to 
exploit the idea that drug use, and the violence and crime with which 
it is associated, is a matter of racial proclivity, then more is at stake than 
mere intransigence on drug policies. What is at stake is the very future 
of our pluralist society. 
It would be comforting to believe that the exploitation of the 
crime/race connection is a recent and passing aberration.162 However, 
the fact that political interest in maintaining the connection between 
drugs and race has been a central theme of drug prohibition from the 
outset is particularly worrisome.163 Opium prohibition arose first in the 
Western states, in the wake of an influx of cheap Chinese labor "im-
ported" in the middle ofthe last century. 164 The initiation of marijuana 
155 Stephen Labaton, Surgeon General Suggests Study of Legalizing Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 
1993, at A23. 
156Id. 
157Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796,103 H.R. 3355 (Sept. 13, 1994). 
158These include special "drug courts" to steer nonviolent drug users into rehabilitation 
programs, as well as programs to reduce gang membership. DavidJohnston & Steven A. Holmes, 
Experts Doubt Effectiveness of Crime Bil~ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1994, at A16. 
159Id.; see also Stephen Green, Capitol Hill III Feelings Won't Help Health Bil~ SAN DIEGO 
UNION-ThIB., Aug. 28, 1994, at A33; John Aloysius Farrell, GOP Senators Plan Assault on Crime 
Bil~ BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 23,1994, at l. 
160 Johnston & Holmes, supra note 158, at A16. 
161 The famous Willie Horton advertisement used in the George Bush-Michael Dukakis 
presidential race may be the most overt use of this tactic in modern presidential campaigns. 
162 Although the Horton ad was never fully repudiated, the excesses at the 1992 Republican 
National Convention may have contributed to the defeat of President Bush. For example, a speech 
delivered by Pat Buchanan stated: "There is a religious war going on .... We must take back our 
cities, and take back our culture, and take back our country." David Nyhan, Pat Talks a Great 
War, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 1992, at 15. 
163H. WAYNE MORGAN, DRUGS IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY 1800-198093-94 (1981). 
164THORNTON, supra note 138, at 60. 
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prohibition in the depths of the Depression was almost directly linked 
to a wave of cheap labor from Mexico. l65 Alcohol prohibition was also 
linked to xenophobia. For example, the Progressive Era, which led to 
some very important reforms, is also associated with Prohibition. That 
movement, according to one scholar: 
was based largely on the fears of middle- [sic] and upper-class 
citizens in a rapidly changing society .... The lower-class and 
immigrant populations were growing and congregating in the 
rapidly expanding urban areas. . . . Progressive policies . . . 
were largely the result of a conservatism and an attempt to 
fix society, enforce middle-class morality, and protect the old 
stock American way of life.166 
In truth, the use of psychotropic substances is, and always has 
been, widely indulged in by most of our population.167 The salient 
point, however, is that the dominant culture-white middle-class peo-
ple-has always identified the use of "bad" substances with the "other," 
whomever the other might be at different phases of our history. One 
scholar of the subject summed up this component of race and class as 
follows: 
Despite proclamations about being an open society and ex-
hortations to believe that the American dream can be even-
tually realized by anyone willing to work hard, we have always 
had an underclass of the unemployed, underemployed, and 
undereducated for whom entry to the middle class is an 
exceedingly low probability. That this large underclass exists 
and that negative attitudes about it are held by the middle 
and upper classes are partly responsible for the ferocity with 
which the drug war is waged. It is not difficult for many who 
make up the middle and upper classes to think of people who 
are poor or afflicted by economic and racial stereotypes as 
somehow qualitatively different and resigned to bearing the 
burdens of well-intended anti-drug laws that turn out to have 
repressive consequences for these people-who happen nei-
ther to vote in large numbers nor to lobby their legislators. l68 
165 Id. at 53-54, 66; see also Schmoke, supra note 17, at 507. 
166THORNTON, supra note 138, at 53. 
167 See VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 8-10, 13-14; see also infra notes 227-55 and accompanying 
text, for a discussion of the treatment of licit drugs. 
168VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 10 (citing JOHN HELMER, DRUGS AND MINORITY OPPRESSION 
(1975)). Vallance credits Helmer with the insights drawn and concludes that "Helmer does not 
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The prediction then, that our leaders are politically constrained 
to maintain the current prohibition posture, is closely related to the 
second basis for a prediction of stasis: the cultural/moral ground. 
2. The Cultural Roots of Prohibition 
More than a few commentators locate the underpinnings of the 
drug prohibition policy in a long strand of puritanism in American 
culture and history.169 To this day, there is a strong strain of moralism 
in anti-drug attitudes, and our leaders constantly mine this vein by 
referring to the evil and immoral nature of drug dependence and 
use. 170 So long as a large proportion of the population believes that 
drug use is sinful, a form of debauchery, detrimental to the work ethic, 
wasteful, and generally deleterious, there will be built-in resistance to 
any reform of the prohibition laws. I7l Dr. Thomas Szasz, in an icono-
clastic and polemical attack on drug prohibition, describes this cultural 
strain of American moralism most colorfully. In a nation as diverse as 
ours, he asks: "What makes a person an American?" He answers that, 
lacking other grounds, 
[W] e habitually fall back on the most primitive yet most en-
during basis for group cohesion, namely, scapegoating. Hence 
the American passion for moral crusades, which, thanks to the 
modern medicalization of morals, now appear as crusades 
against disease .... 
To understand America's protracted struggle against drugs, 
we must situate the current anti-drug hysteria in the context 
of this nation's historical penchant for waging moral cru-
sades. Since Colonial times, the New World was perceived-by 
settlers and foreign observers alike-as a New Promised Land, 
attribute this condition to conscious conspiracy, but sees it as the natural, if unplanned, outcome 
of the maintenance of power by the powerful." Id. at 11. 
169 See Musto, supra note 27, at 33; see also GORE VIDAL, HOMAGE TO DANIEL SHAYS: COL-
LECTED ESSAYS 1952-1972 (1972). Of course we have no monopoly in the depth of moral offense 
that self-indulgent behavior provokes. As one writer noted, the Egyptians banned coffee in the 
sixteenth century, China penalized opium sellers by strangulation, and the Sultan of the Ottoman 
Empire executed tobacco smokers, as did the Czar of Russia in the seventeenth century. Boaz, 
supra note 35, at 617. The former U.S. drug czar, William Bennett, accepted the idea of beheading 
drug dealers as morally supportable. See Editorial, Crackmire, Drug Czar William Bennett Advocates 
Beheading Dealers, NEW REpUBLIC, Sept. 11, 1989, at 7 (quoting portions from The Larry King 
Show (CNN television broadcast, June 15, 1989»; see also VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 71. 
170VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 18. 
171 See SZASZ, supra note 15, at 31-34. 
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a place where man, corrupted in the Old World, was reborn, 
uncorrupted.172 
Finally, Dr. Szasz closes his discussion by noting that "[f] ormerly, 
the conviction that America's manifest destiny was the moral reforma-
tion of the world was couched in clerical terms, as a fight against sin 
(drinking as 'intemperance'); now, it is couched in clinical terms, as a 
fight against disease (drug use as 'chemical dependency')."173 
While emphasizing this disease metaphor, Dr. Szasz also acknow-
ledges the continuing power of religious imagery, quoting former drug 
czar William Bennett: "It [drug abuse] is a product of the Great 
Deceiver . . . we need to bring to these people in need the God who 
heals. "174 With the rapid approach of the millennium and the rise of 
evangelism, fundamentalism, and the so-called "religious right," it would 
be unwise to underestimate the force of the opposition these groups 
exert in favor of a fervent commitment to our drug war policy.175 
The moralistic and puritanical chord does not playas important 
a part in the social context of the Latin American support for pro hi-
bition.176 However, there are cultural and social forces operating in the 
Latin American countries that pose obstacles to any retreat from the 
policy of prohibition. Given the horrors and outrages that "narco-
traffickers" have visited on their own countries and people, there is the 
understandable desire for vindication, particularly among those who 
have suffered direcdy. That vindication, however, may never be achieved 
by clinging to a failed policy. The last obstacle the countries of the 
Caribbean region and beyond must overcome is their subservience and 
dependence upon the hegemony of the United States.177 Given the 
economic and political power of the United States, that may be easier 
said than done. 
172Id. at 32-33. 
173Id. at 34. 
174Id. at 32. 
175 If there is any lingering doubt that such groups as the Christian Coalition, led by Pat 
Robertson, have a national political agenda, the list of presidential candidates addressing the 
1994 Coalition conference should dispel that doubt. See Richard L. Berke, From the Right, Some 
Words of Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1994, at A9. 
176 But see In re A. Sochandamandou, File No. C-221/94, Constitutional Court of Justice, 
Republic of Colombia (May 5, 1994), infra note 192. 
J77 See David R. Mares, The Logic of Inter-American Cooperation on Drugs, in DRUG POLICY IN 
THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 335-36 (describing the skewed inter-American drug policy as a 
game involving the U.S. as "bully"); see also Walker, supra note 60, at 272-73 (discussing the highly 
coercive U.S.-directed "Operation Intercept" in Mexico). See generally Maria Celia Toro, Unilat-
eralism and Bilateralism, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 314-28 (describing 
the relationship of the United States and Mexico regarding drug enforcement, noting issues of 
national pride and sovereignty). 
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3. The Institutional Support of Prohibition 
If Sir Isaac Newton had been a political scientist rather than a 
physicist, he still may have discovered his first law of motion: bodies at 
rest tend to stay at rest and bodies in motion tend to stay in motion. 
The third reason that there is likely to be no reform of the drug 
prohibition regime is bureaucratic inertia. 
One of the greatest difficulties in assessing and understanding 
current drug policies is the great disparity and uncertainty of data 
relating to drug use and costs. Without standardized measurements, 
comparisons are difficult or impossible. Added to this is the fact that 
as an illicit, underground activity, even the raw data are both hard to 
come by and inherently unreliable. 178 Additionally, there is no reliable 
baseline. During the long history of non-regulation of drugs, use fluc-
tuated quite dramatically from period to period.179 Thus, there is no 
method to separate the underlying currents in drug use from the 
consequences of enforcement.18o This means that both the claims of 
officials committed to the existing policy, as well as the claims of those 
who advocate decriminalization, can be supported by conflicting em-
pirical studies. 
The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), for instance, re-
ported a decline in the number of current illegal drug users from 23 
million in 1985 to 12.9 million in 1992, and a dramatic decline in 
current cocaine users during the same period, from 2.9% of the over-
twelve population to 0.8%, a decline of approximately 660,000 users.181 
However, another study, perhaps more reliably based on hospital emer-
gency admissions and criminal statistics, put the number of cocaine 
users during that same time period at more than three times as high-
2.2 million users.182 There is also no explanation for the discrepancy 
178 By comparison, data on tobacco and alcohol consumption are relatively easy to compile 
accurately because their sales are taxed. 
179 See Musto, supra note 27, at 29-44. 
180 For example, drug use increased substantially during the "rebellious" 1970s. Did this rise 
occur because of governmental permissiveness, or because of the anguish that divided the 
nation-initially along generational lines-over the Vietnam war, or was it the result of the 
returning, embittered veterans, who had turned to drugs as a means of escaping the horrors of 
a bloody, losing war? 
181 Smith, supra note 10, at 3-4 (citing NAT'L INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES 1985 
(1987); NAT'L INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: POPULATION ESTIMATES 1990 (1991». Professor Smith 
sheds serious doubt on the NIDA statistics. He notes that they are voluntarily derived from 
households and high school graduates, surveys that are likely to miss the homeless, the down-
trodden, and prison populations. See id. at 4. 
182 Smith, supra note 10, at 5 n.7 (citing STAFF REpORT, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
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between the NIDA's use figures and data showing that cocaine avail-
able for export to the United States during this same period remained 
almost unchanged. 183 Whatever the data, the United States government 
and public continue to perceive the drug problem in crisis terms and 
continue to expend enormous resources in combating drug use with-
out obvious success. Given the substantial expenditures by the United 
States on its "drug war" policy, it is not surprising that drug enforce-
ment officials continually claim that we are winning the war, and that 
we therefore must stay the course or renew our efforts.184 
This is not to question the strong conviction in the virtue of, and 
commitment to, the vigorous pursuit of the drug war by the "foot 
soldiers," the law enforcement officials constantly engaged in the war 
on drugs. Many risk and some lose their lives in this battle, and they 
are rarely honored except in moments of loss.185 It is only natural that 
UNITED STATES SENATE, HARD-CORE COCAINE ADDICTS: MEASURING-AND FIGHTING-THE EPI-
DEMIC (1990». 
183 See Smith, supra note 10, at 14, Table 1-5 (citing Worldwide Cocaine Production Quantities 
Available for Export to United States, 1986-1990, unpublished figures by U.S. Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, 1990). None of these efforts to ascertain use patterns and trends account for 
questions of drug potency or shifts in use techniques, such as the rise in "crack" consumption. 
Economist Milton Friedman has asserted that the development of crack is an economic conse-
quence of prohibition. His argument is that the high cost of powdered cocaine, driven up by the 
government effort to eliminate it, led to the development of a product that was more affordable. 
Friedman, An open Letter to Bill Bennett, supra note 80, at A16. But see Mark A.R. Kleiman, Bennett 
Fears 'Public Policy Disaster,' It's Already Here, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1989, at A15 (positing that 
crack was not invented as a cheap substitute for poorer users but instead by rich users looking 
for a more intense drug experience). 
184 "I can say with confidence that we are moving toward victory .... Things seem to be 
getting better: Press on, and they will get better still." Smith, supra note 1 0, at 3 (quoting remarks 
of the former director of the Office of the National Drug Control Policy, Bob Martinez). 
185 See DEA Agents Killed in Crash Mourned As Anti-Drug Martyrs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1994, 
at A17 ("Five U.S. narcotics enforcement special agents who perished in a plane crash in the 
Andes Mountains last week were honored Saturday as martyrs to the struggle for a safer America 
and world."). One may question whether "scouting for clandestine airfields in the cocaine 
suppression operation" has made any real difference in terms of the amount of cocaine produc-
tion and shipment. Id. 
During the height of the Bush Administration's highly publicized offensive against drugs, 
highlighted by cocaine seizures at record levels in 1989, the impact on cost and supply was 
negligible. In one case alone more than twenty-one tons of cocaine said to be worth up to $20 
billion on the street was confiscated. Scott Ladd, N. Y. Drug War a Bust, So Far; Street Prices Same, 
Experts Say, NEWSDAY, Oct. 15, 1989, at 4. In fiscal year 1988, fifty-seven tons of cocaine were 
seized, but a chief in the narcotics division noted that the fact that the "availability of drugs 
doesn't appear to be dwindling" was "staggering." Id. 
In the above 1989 NEWSDAY account, the wholesale price of a kilo of cocaine was quoted at 
between $18,000 and $20,000. Id. In a 1994 New York Times article, the price ofa kilo of cocaine 
was quoted at $20,000.joseph B. Treaster, 79 Seized in New York and Italy Echoing Pizza Connection 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1994, at Al (describing the arrests of a major New York drug ring). 
The fact that the price had not fluctuated for five years calls for some explanation regarding the 
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people engaged in this undertaking, particularly in the "front lines," 
need and seek vindication in their skirmishes, in order to believe that 
their efforts are not futile. 186 Bureaucratic inertia aside, it is not easy to 
turn one's back on such sacrifices. Still, it is questionable whether the 
same respect is due the policymakers and high officials who, at no risk 
to themselves beyond a poten tialloss of power and status,187 refuse even 
to review the dubiousness of existing drug policies. With regard to the 
"generals" in this war,I88 there is reason to suspect that an operative 
force is the tendency within bureaucracies to stick with the status quo, 
and the will to expand vested power and influence.18g 
efficacy of the U.S. government's strategy of disrupting cocaine supply, unless one believes the 
law of supply and demand was suspended during the period. It also might cause one to wonder 
whether cocaine use had dropped in the intervening years. 
186 At a hemispheric conference in which this author presented a paper on drug policy in 
the Caribbean Region, an anguished and angry delegate from El Salvador objected strongly to 
any suggestion of decriminalization and reconciliation. He said that we must not allow the lives 
lost in this struggle to have been in vain. Others have echoed his sentiments: 
The mere discussion of decriminalization may be very painful for the families of 
police officers slain during narcotics enforcement .... America's overdue recon-
ciliation with those who performed military service in Vietnam may provide us with 
a guide: our admiration and respect for those who fought in their nation's service 
stands apart from our judgment of the wisdom of that war. If we are to decriminal-
ize, there should be ... no failure to recognize the sacrifices made-the lives 
lost-in a fight against profiteering. Decriminalization can be the final, winning 
salvo in the battle against illegal drug trafficking. 
Schuler & McBride, supra note 2, at 934. 
187 A rather negative review of Mr. Lee Brown, the current director of the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy (the current "drug czar"), dwells on the excessive expenditures of that office 
on the "trappings of power" and security measures. Byron York, Clinton's Phony Drug War, 
Do-Nothing Drug Czar, Lee Brown, Has Cabinet Status, But No Ideas, No Goals, and No Money-
Which is Just the Way the President Wants It, AM. SPECTATOR, Feb. 1994, at 40. 
188 
The war on drugs thus becomes the perfect war for people who would rather not 
fight a war, a war in which the politicians who stand so fearlessly on the side of the 
good, the true, and the beautiful need do nothing else but strike noble poses as 
protectors of the people and defenders of the public trust. 
Howard, supra note 152, at A9 (quoting Lewis Lapham). 
189 Under the Reagan and Bush Administrations, the budgets of federal agencies involved in 
prosecuting the war on drugs were dramatically expanded. Agencies such as Customs, the Coast 
Guard, the DEA, the FBI, the IRS, and the CIA, as well as state and local agencies involved in 
drug law enforcement, all feed at the drug war trough. These expenditures have increased 
exponentially in the last twenty years. See DEALING WITH DRUGS: CONSEQUENCES OF GoVERNMENT 
CONTROL 7 (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1987): 
Id. 
There are large numbers of people, principally employees of law enforcement 
agencies, who have a vested interest [in increased prohibition expenditures]. Any 
serious, reform of the nations' drug laws is bound to meet powerful resistance ... 
from groups within the ... bureaucracy ... who have capitalized on our current 
policy and who have a great deal to gain from its maintenance. 
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A good example of the bureaucratic instinct to sustain itself can 
be drawn from an historical parallel: passage of the marijuana prohi-
bition law in 1937.190 Marijuana prohibition was enacted long before 
marijuana emerged as a recreational substance. Some analysts argued 
that the Federal Narcotics Bureau, led by the former Prohibition com-
missioner Harry Anslinger, pushed the adoption of the new prohibi-
tion as a means of sustaining its own bureaucratic survival and growth 
in the face of budget cuts during the Great Depression.191 It would be 
uncharacteristic and surprising if today's far more extensive and pow-
erful bureaucratic drug control establishment did not behave similarly 
during the current budgetary stringency. 
As important and powerful as the three previously discussed ob-
stacles to change may be, each could be overcome by a leadership 
willing to consider alternatives and to experiment with reform. Princi-
ples of equality, individualism, tolerance, and compassion, all of which 
flow steadily through the currents of American idealism, can be tapped 
by a willing leadership.192 It is not as clear whether strong leadership 
190 Marihuana Tax Act of1937, Aug. 2, 1937, ch. 553, 50 Stat. 551; as amended Feb. 10, 1939, 
ch. 2, 53 Stat. 1 §§ 2590-2604 and Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 1, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4741 
et seq. (1964). 
191 THORNTON, supra note 138, at 6~7. 
1921n this century, the United States Supreme Court has led the shift in national policy 
regarding the legacies of slavery and racial discrimination. Perhaps the judiciary will lead the way 
in a reform of drug law policy; we might look to Latin America for a recent example of such 
jurisprudence. 
In a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Colombia, a closely divided Court declared 
that those provisions of Colombian law that punished persons for possession of addictive drugs 
in amounts described in the law as "doses for personal use" (which in the case of cocaine was set 
at one gram or less), or required the commitment of addicts to psychiatric clinics, were uncon-
stitutional. The Court rested its decision on constitutional norms that "respected human dignity," 
recognized the "priority of the inalienable rights of an individual, such as autonomy as an 
immediate expression of freedom," and the "right to equality." The decision sounded strongly in 
terms of the right to privacy and autonomy and the right to control one's body. Cf Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (upholding the right of individuals to view proscribed obscene 
material in the privacy of the horne). The Court reviewed a provision which called for com-
mittment of addicts to clinics as punishment for their illnesses, and identified the provision as a 
confinement for an open-ended period of time that could exceed the allowed criminal sanctions. 
The Court therefore held that it violated both rights of equality and personal freedom. Cf 
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
The Court stressed that its decision did not affect the provisions of existing drug laws, insofar 
as they deal with the transportation, storage, production, elaboration, or selling of narcotics, and 
thereby did not contravene the obligation of the state to abide by international treaties respecting 
the regulation of drugs. See infra note 283 and accompanying text. Finally, the Court indicated 
that the state may reasonably regulate matters of place, age, and activities in which drug con-
sumption would be considered socially offensive. One other unusual feature was that the Attorney 
General joined the petitioner arguing that the provisions under review were unconstitutional. 
The Department of Justice defended the statute. See In reA. Sochandamandou, File No. C-221/94, 
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could overcome the great weight of the economic foundations of the 
prohibition regime. 
4. The Economic Superstructure of Prohibition 
The institutional intransigence of the government may be minor 
as compared to the stake that private and quasi-private interests have 
in the status quo. First, as with any significant government expendi-
tures, there is the usual multiplier effect on the rest of the economy. 
Jobs and economic activity are created, as police forces, court systems, 
and numbers of government agents and prison personnel expand, and 
private sector responses also occur. Opportunities present themselves 
for weapons manufacturers to supply the police and "narcs" with in-
creasingly sophisticated tools. Construction companies build new pris-
ons and court facilities,193 and building material producers supply the 
construction workers. Lawyers defend the increased numbers of sus-
pects and detainees and advise those not yet caught. The list goes on 
and on. Further, because current policy remains unable to stop drug 
trafficking, bankers, accountants, and real estate brokers all benefit in 
this lucrative trade,194 as it generates billions in cash profits that require 
laundering. Each financial transaction, in turn, has its own multiplier 
effect. These public and private benefits of current drug policy repre-
sent major obstacles to any change in the status quO.195 Powerful inter-
ests in the private sector thus seek to maintain the jobs and profits that 
Constitutional Court of Justice, Republic of Colombia (May 5, 1994) (opinion and English 
translation on file with the Boston College Third World Law JournaL The author wishes to express 
his gratitude for the translation to Boston College Law School students Anabel Crescenzi and 
Rafael Garcia). 
The immediate response to the decision from both the governments of Colombia and the 
United States was critical. ~ Joseph B. Treaster, Use of Drugs is Legalized Uy Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7,1993, at A3. For commentary about the decision, see C. Torres, Legalize It?, NATION, June 
20, 1994, at 857. 
193 See Steven A Holmes, The Boom in Jails is Locking Up Lots of Loot, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 
1994, at E3 (discussing prison building "boom"). 
194 See infra note 269. 
195 Professor Thornton emphasizes prohibition in his analysis of "rent seeking." He describes 
this as the search for privilege and personal gain through the political process. He distinguishes 
it from corruption in that rent seeking is legal. In its most obvious form, rent seeking entails 
lobbying by private interests. THORNTON, supra note 138, at 6. Again, the best insight about this 
ongoing process is drawn from the past. Thornton describes how various interest groups fought 
for and against the original alcohol and drug prohibition proposals both openly and secretly, 
including such expected players as whiskey and beer producers, patent medicine manufacturers, 
and pharmaceutical companies. He also notes less obvious players, such as soft drink manufac-
turers, the medical and the pharmacy professions, and even such remote rent seekers as manu-
facturers of artificial fibers interested in removing the competition from hemp, a byproduct of 
the marijuana plant. Id. at 47-69. 
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the current drug policy engenders. Bankers, construction company 
executives, lawyers, weapons manufacturers, and most importantly, the 
legal drug industry196 have traditionally been among the most powerful 
voices in both the public and private debate on the side of maintaining 
and even enhancing current drug control policies.197 Given the range 
of economic benefits that accrue to so many sectors of the economy, 
change in policy seems virtually unthinkable. 
Many of the same obstacles that block reform of drug policies in 
the United States are in full force in Latin America and sustain a 
situation that is possibly even more fraught with egregious distortions 
of public policy. The harm of the dominant drug policy and its impact 
on the fabric of society and democratic rule in Latin America has 
reached intolerable proportions in terms of misery, violence, and cor-
ruption.198 Indeed, the war on drugs in the producing countries is 
often transformed into real war.199 The extent of the devastation itself 
may ultimately allow or induce the Latin American governments and 
citizens to overcome obstacles to changing the prevailing policy of 
prohibition, long before the United States reaches that step.200 Never-
theless, the obstacles to such reform taking place first in Latin America 
remain formidable. 
Foremost among these obstacles is the simple fact that the drug 
trade is perceived as economically critical to the producing and proc-
essing countries of the region. Although the data varies widely, one 
measure of the importance of the drug trade to Colombia is reflected 
in the estimate that narco-traffickers201 may command 30% of the total 
196 The interests of the first and last players in this partial list of countervailing interests are 
discussed in the next subsection of this paper. 
197This summary of obvious beneficiaries does not include the drug cartels, the traffickers, 
the transshippers, the "enforcers," and the street operators, those up and down the extensive and 
massive illicit drug chain enterprise, and the myriad of incidental beneficiaries of all this eco-
nomic activity. Whether publicly acknowledged or not, the drug trade "employs" many young 
people who otherwise have no comparable means of making a living. It would not be surprising 
if a sizeable investment were made by the drug operators regularly on behalf of opponents of 
change. Mter all, no one stands to lose more than the drug operators from a move toward 
legalization. But see infra notes 286 and 291. 
198For a discussion of these same points--assaults on democratic principles and civilliber-
ties-See supra Part II and notes 131-48. 
1995mith has identified seven simultaneous drug wars going on in Latin America: (1) U.S. 
vs. suppliers; (2) Latin American governments vs. narco-terrorists; (3) Latin American govern-
ments vs. guerrillas; (4) Latin American governments vs. narco-traffickers; (5) Narco-traffickers 
vs. narco-traffickers; (6) Narco-traffickers vs. guerrillas; and (7) Narco-traffickers vs. political left. 
Smith, supra note 10, at 12. 
200 See e.g., In re A. Sochandamandu, supra note 192. 
201 This is a misnomer. Cocaine is not a narcotic; it is a stimulant. See supra note 13. 
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wealth of Colombians, within and outside the country.202 The contri-
bution of cocaine to the Colombian economy is about double that of 
the largest legal export, coffee.203 In addition, the gross private fixed 
investment in Colombia between 1976 and 1986 averaged $2.8 billion 
per year, a figure that was about the same as or somewhat less than 
narco-traffic annual profits.204 In Peru, a classic example of an export 
economy, the most profitable export crop from the 1970s through the 
1980s was coca leaf.205 Extrapolating from coca leaf production data, 
one researcher speculated that the export of coca base and paste206 
equaled between 14.3% and 35.4% of Peru's total legal exports in 
1988.207 The total employment effect of coca-related activity ranged 
between 2.7% and 4.5% of the total work force and 6.8%-11.5% of 
Peru's agricultural employment.208 In Bolivia the story is the same, or 
even more pronounced. Coca production in Bolivia was estimated 
to be 6.38% of the gross national product (GNP) in 1988.209 It can 
confidently be stated, then, that "[f]or poverty-stricken and crisis-rid-
den economies, [the drug trade] windfalls can only seem to be a 
blessing. Local governments can hardly be expected to implement 
[U.S.-proposed crop] eradication with enthusiasm."210 
In addition to the economic power and importance of the drug 
trade to Latin American nations, the policy of prohibition has allowed 
drug operators to gain political and military power. They have used 
this power to terrorize those who have the audacity to challenge them. 
The use of raw political power through terrorism and violence in 
Colombia has been extensively documented.211 In Peru and Bolivia, the 
drug lords made common cause with campesinos212 and gained politi-
202 Thoumi, supra note 140, at 68. 
203RILEY, supra note 1, at 15. 
204 Id. at 68. 
205 Alvarez, supra note 13, at 72. 
206 Paste and base are chemically distilled forms of the psychoactive substance found in coca 
leaves. For a lively and accessible description of the movement from coca fields, through the 
processing, shipping, and cutting-functions, see INCIARDI, supra note 53, at 72-78. 
207 Alvarez, supra note 13, at 79. 
208 Id. 
209 Machicado, supra note 13, at 90. 
210 Smith, supra note 10, at 9. 
211 See supra note 8. 
212 The campesinos are another class of victims in this international cocaine trade. Coca may 
be the only cash crop that provides them with the means to subsist. However, the prices the 
peasants receive for their crops are not even remotely related to the price cocaine commands in 
the market place. One estimate was that coca leaves were sold at the jungle refineries for $8-12 
per kilo, in some cases after being carried over hundreds of miles of footpaths. The price for 
60 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:19 
cal power and allies by resisting the crop eradication programs pro-
moted by the United States.213 Thus, in all three major producing and 
processing countries, the perverse political effects of the prohibition 
policy are hard to ignore.214 
B. Inconsistencies Reveal Powerful Interests Supporting Prohibition Policy 
Given all the reasons in favor of reform, are the foregoing obsta-
cles to change enough to explain the intransigence? Perhaps, but it is 
likely that there are less obvious forces working to maintain the status 
quo as well. Cui Bono (Who stands to gain)?215 There are three prime 
candidates: the drug dealers, the financial institutions that profit from 
the illicit trade, and the competitors in the field of psychoactive sub-
stances. Although the first group has substantial clout in the producing 
countries, through means that involve intimidation, terror, corruption, 
and investment,216 there are no grounds for believing that the traffick-
ers are a voice in the muted debate that may exist in the United States. 
The same cannot be said for the other two prime candidates, since 
their voice in policy circles is familiar and strong. 
If the monetary figures that are referred to at the outset of the 
next sub-section are accurate, financial institutions have a great incen-
tive to sustain the cash-flow generated by the drug traffic. This suggests 
that at least a brief examination of money laundering enforcement is 
in order. 
For two reasons, it is also important to consider the treatment of 
industries that produce the substances that compete with illicit drugs.217 
First, this examination exposes inconsistencies in government policy, 
and second, it demonstrates who has the most to lose if non-patentable, 
street cocaine at the time this estimate was given was approximately $65,000 per kilo. INCIARDI, 
supra note 53, at 73, 78. However, estimates vary so widely that none is reliable. See PAUL EDDY 
ET AL., THE COCAINE WARS 48-49 (1988) (reporting the estimate ofa Drug Enforcement Agent 
in 1979, that $625 of coca leaves was worth $560,000 dollars on the street); see also War on 
MarijuanaDraws Complaints in California, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1994, at B9. By analogy, California 
growers are not that different from Andean farmers when it comes to protecting their livelihood. 
213 See Smith, supra note 10, at 26; Jose Guillermo Justiniano, The Power of Coca Producers, in 
DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 101-04. For additional discussion of the political 
strategy of cartels, see supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text. 
214 See generaUy RILEY, supra note 1. 
215For a rather cynical answer to this question see Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 639 n.147 
(citing comments of Dr. Thomas Szasz published at Symposium ProCf!lldings: Roundtable Discussion, 
11 NOVA L. REv. 957-58 (1987». 
216 See supra notes 8, 212-14 and accompanying text. 
217These industries include tobacco, alcohol, numerous prescription drugs that are dis-
pensed by physicians and mental health professionals, and dozens more over-the-counter drugs. 
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illicit mood altering drugs and pain alleviators were ever allowed to 
compete in the open market. 
1. Ineffective Money Laundering Enforcement 
As noted, economic interests are the dominant reason for main-
taining the status quo in drug policy. By almost any measure, the profits 
generated by the illicit drug trade are enormous. The annual retail 
market for drugs in the United States is estimated at $120 billion and 
the annual profits are believed to exceed $25 billion. This is more than 
the combined net earnings of the nation's eight largest corporations.218 
Extraordinary wealth such as this is bound to create prosperous and 
powerful entities with a direct stake in maintaining the status quo. 
Without effective money laundering techniques, drug traffickers 
would be drowning in illicit $20 bills. Every movement of cash-every 
transfer, purchase, or investment-would risk discovery and subsequent 
forfeiture.219 Money laundering protects purchases, investments, and cash 
reserves by severing their connection to drug trafficking. It enables 
"drug kingpins" to sustain their lavish lifestyles, to invest in other 
holdings and businesses,22o to finance their next drug shipment, and 
to payoff their powerful allies.221 
A successful attack on money laundering could diminish the in-
centive for drug trafficking while curtailing existing traffickers' ability 
to operate. Despite the possible effectiveness of a drug policy focused 
on money laundering, the United States government has failed to 
pursue such activities with any vigor. Money laundering was not even 
a crime until the mid-1980s.222 Since then, the laws have focused on 
interfering with relatively small cash transactions rather than address-
ing the root of the problem-the ease with which large amounts of 
cash may move undetected through electronic transfer. Likewise, al-
218 Allan Dodds Frank, See No Evi~ FORBES, Oct. 6, 1986, at 38. 
219 See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In 1989, the U.S. Justice Department for the 
first time used civil forfeiture laws to order American banks to return money they were holding 
in overseas branches. Paula Dwyer & Pete Engardio, Getting Banks toJust Say 'No', Bus. W., Apr. 
17, 1989, at 16 (discussing how launderers use unsuspecting banks and how banks are strongly 
cooperating). If the government really wanted to throw a wrench into the street trade, where the 
lion's share of the drug income is generated, it would eliminate paper currency altogether. This 
idea of moving almost totally to a credit or debit card payments system would also reduce street 
thefts and the killing of shopkeepers and taxi drivers for their cash on hand. Drug traffickers 
would need forklifts to move their proceeds in the form of coins. 
220 See Thoumi, supra note 140, at 65-66 (discussing investments of "narco-capitalists"). 
221 One report has revealed that New York City street dealers pay as much as 40% of gross 
sales in bribes to police officers in order to avoid arrest. VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 37. 
222 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). 
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though the late 1980s witnessed several indictments for money laun-
dering, the U.S. Justice Department appears to have dragged its heels 
during the investigations.223 Although it is difficult to prove, there are 
strong indications that some of the profits of money laundering find 
their way into the pockets of Washington power brokers.224 
Contrasting the established interests that would be burdened by 
any serious government interference with money laundering, with the 
interests affected by the far more expensive, dangerous, and futile 
'drug bust' efforts, makes it all too clear why the U.S. government 
prefers to pursue the latter. Whereas attacks on money laundering 
would hinder the economic interests of many powerful, established 
groups, the effects of interdiction fall haphazardly on the criminal 
functionaries lower down in the elaborate drug enterprise. 
Focusing on interdiction and enforcement efforts, as opposed to 
money laundering, also confines abuses of human rights in the name 
of the drug war to disenfranchised members of society. Increased 
interference with money laundering activities might upset bank secrecy 
laws and invade the privacy of "legitimate" depositors.225 Likewise, the 
administrative task of tracking drug money would place an undue 
burden on banks and might slow the transfer of legitimate money.226 
2. Treatment of Licit Psychoactive Drugs 
Comparing U.S. drug policy with respect to illicit drugs with U.S. 
policy towards three other forms of mass addiction-alcohol, tobacco, 
and prescription drugs-raises further doubts about the United States 
223 Acting CIA director Richard Kerr testified before a Senate panel that the CIA circulated 
several hundred reports to government agencies between 1983 and 1985, including the Justice 
Department, about the Bank of Credit and Commerce International's (B.C.C.I.) illegal activities, 
but that the Department never pursued the leads. When B.C.C.1. was finally indicted, the Justice 
Department limited its inquiry, informing the law-enforcement community that the case was too 
sensitive to be handled in a routine manner. Congressman Charles Schumer, chairman of the 
HouseJudiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, alleged that the White House was 
involved in monitoring the B.C.C.1. case and that it was likely someone told the prosecutors to 
"layoff B.C.C.I." Jonathan Beaty & S.C. Gwynne, Scandal, Too Many Questions, But Few Answers 
About a Shameless Attempt to Buy Favor with the VVhite House and the Justice Department's Reluctance 
to Investigate B.C.C.I, TIME, Nov. 11, 1991, at 42. 
224For example, the 1988 indictment of B.C.C.1. for money laundering activities raised 
substantial allegations oflinks between the bank and many prominent U.S. politicians, attorneys, 
and lobbyists. Id. 
225 In recognition that the efforts to stop money laundering were time-consuming and 
ineffective, the U.S. Treasury Department reduced the amount of information that banks must 
keep on large cash transactions. Keith Bradsher, Bank Rules on Reporting Relaxed, N.V. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 1994, at A33. 
226 It is ironic at best that body-cavity searches and physical seizures of individuals are viewed 
as necessary sacrifices to the war on drugs, but monitoring the wire transfer of money is considered 
too intrusive. See supra note 98. 
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government's motivation. In contrast to its strict prohibition stance 
towards marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, the United States government 
supports, promotes, and at times even subsidizes legal drugs. 227 It is 
difficult to understand the radical difference in this approach because 
there is no corresponding difference in the addictive substances them-
selves. From the viewpoint of the drug user, the licit and illicit forms 
of addiction serve similar purposes: they help individuals relax, achieve 
pleasure, relieve pain or stress, or in many cases cope with what they 
deem to be insufferable conditions of life. In physiological terms, licit 
drugs do not offer a more attractive solution; they are often no less 
addictive than illegal drugs,228 and often pose a greater risk of physical 
harm to the drug user. Although the effects of most drugs are limited 
to the central nervous system, alcohol and cigarettes also cause sub-
stantial damage to other organs, such as the heart, liver, and lungs.229 
Cigarette smoking, in particular, is considered the largest single health 
risk and most preventable cause of premature death in the United 
States. It is estimated that 15% of all deaths in the United States-ap-
proximately 350,000 per year-are related to smoking.230 Further, al-
though abuse of prescription drugs such as amphetamines and barbi-
turates does not cause the tissue damage that cigarettes and alcohol 
cause, the health risks they create are no less severe than those created 
by illicit drugs. Moreover, psychotropic drugs have a toxic effect on the 
central nervous system and, like illicit drugs, they also create a sig-
nificant risk of overdose.231 
227 See infra notes 242--45. 
228 See ROBERT E. GOODIN, No SMOKING 26-27 (1989). According to the U.S. Surgeon 
General, the pharmacological and behavioral processes that determine tobacco addiction are 
highly similar to those that determine addiction to drugs such as heroin and cocaine. Likewise, 
the relapse rate-the percentage of ex-addicts who are back on a drug after a given period-is 
almost identical for nicotine and heroin. Id. For comparisons of these common addictive sub-
stances, see Philip J. Hilts, Is Nicotine Addictive? It Depends on Whose Criteria You Use, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 2,1994, at C3. One expert noted that the "quit rate" for Vietnam veterans addicted to heroin 
was 30% per year, whereas the rate for tobacco was 2.5% per year. Philip J. Hilts, Philip Morris 
Blocked '83 Paper Showing Tobacco is Addictive, Panel Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1994, at A21. 
Further, withdrawal from alcohol and sedatives is frequently more severe and life-threatening 
than withdrawal from cocaine or heroin. See AWNI ARIF & JOSEPH WESTERMEYER, MANUAL OF 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE 217 (1988). 
229 See ARIF & WESTERMEYER, supra note 228, at 137, 224. 
230 ELIZABETH M. WHELAN, A SMOKING GUN: How THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY GETS AWAY WITH 
MURDER 10 (1984). See also GOODIN, supra note 228, at 8-9. The harm goes beyond the user. 
Philip J. Hilts, Children of Smoking Mothers Show Carcinogens in Blood, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1994, 
at B8. According to a recent report, maternal cigarette smoking may pose a greater risk to a fetus 
than maternal cocaine use. Skolnick, supra note 55, at 1636. See also supra note 55 for a discussion 
of cocaine harm to fetuses. 
231 See ARIF & WESTERMEYER, supra note 228, at 217-22. 
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Not only do the legal forms of addiction pose a greater risk of 
harm to the individual, but abuse of these substances also presents a 
greater threat to the overall health and welfare of American society 
than does the abuse of illegal drugs. This increased threat is partially 
due to the prevalence of legal drug abuse throughout all sectors of 
society.232 According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
alcohol is the most widely abused mind-altering substance in the United 
States.233 Significantly, most of the remaining drug abuse involves le-
gitimately produced psychotropic drugs.234 The extensive abuse of these 
substances, combined with the grave health risks associated with their 
use, impose significant costs on society. In fact, the relative cost to 
society of alcohol abuse is approximately twice the cost associated with 
all illicit drugs, and the loss of employment due to alcohol abuse is ten 
times as great.235 Similarly, tobacco use is believed to cost society three 
times as much as illegal drug abuse.236 
Despite the addictive and harmful nature of alcohol, tobacco, and 
prescription drugs, and the substantial costs imposed on society by 
their abuse, these substances lie beyond the realm of the United States 
government's war on drugs.237 By ignoring the problems of "legal drug 
abuse," the u.s. government permits the manufacture, distribution, 
and use of alcohol, tobacco, and prescription drugs with only minimal 
interference. Possibly alcohol and tobacco can be distinguished from 
marijuana, cocaine, and opium derivatives, but how can the strict 
regulation of these illicit drugs be distinguished from the tardy and 
inconsequential regulation of psychotropic prescription drugs? As early 
as the 1950s, experts recognized that abuse of amphetamines and 
2321n contrast, although cocaine was initially a glamour drug of the rich and then a recrea-
tional drug of the middle classes, it has increasingly taken on widespread use among the underclasses 
of the inner citites, particularly in its more dangerous form of crack. LAMOND TuLLIS, HANDBOOK 
OF RESEARCH ON THE ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFIC: SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 6-7 
(1991). Tobacco use reflects a similar trend. Michael Specter, Less-Educated, Poor More Likely to 
Smoke, WASH. POST,Jan. 6, 1989, atM. 
233 ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 24-25; JOHN PEKKANEN, THE AMERICAN CONNEC-
TION 14 (1973). 
234 A 1970 report by the National Commission on Drug Abuse indicated that one billion 
gallons of spirits, wine and beer were sold and 214 million prescriptions for psychotropic drugs 
were issued in a single year. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 24-25. 
235 Id. at 40. "The drug most frequently associated with crime and violence is alcohol." 
Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 658. The same is true with respect to the correlation with accidents. 
Id. 
236 Not only is $11 billion per year spent on direct medical costs for smoking-related diseases, 
$36 billion is lost through reduced productivity, and more than $300 million worth of property 
is destroyed each year by fires ignited by cigarettes. WHELAN, supra note 230, at 13. These 
references do not even include recently discovered harms associated with second-hand smoke. 
237 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 15, at 7. 
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barbiturates posed a serious danger to society. In fact, because of the 
prevalence of abuse, these substances were believed by some to create 
a greater threat than narcotics.238 Nonetheless, despite substantial prod-
ding by factions concerned with the abuse of prescription drugs, Con-
gress refused to include these substances in the Narcotics Control Act 
of 1956.239 Even when in 1966, pro-control forces finally managed to 
pass a record-keeping law for manufacturers and distributors of psy-
chotropic drugs, the powerful pharmaceutical lobby managed to en-
sure that the law was weak and ineffective. Likewise, when a federal 
crime bill was passed two years later, it imposed stiff penalties only on 
small-time peddlers and possessors. The mass producers of the drugs 
were given only minimal penalties for shipping drugs to illegal sources.240 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the radical difference in 
treatment accorded manufactured psychotropic drugs and the prohib-
ited substances was that the former were produced largely in the 
United States, and the latter were natural, largely imported substances.241 
Perhaps even more disturbing than the United States govern-
ment's hands-off approach to legal forms of drug addiction, is its active 
promotion and subsidization of the tobacco industry. To begin with, 
the United States government helps to ensure an adequate supply of 
tobacco to support mass addiction to cigarettes by guaranteeing to-
bacco farmers a minimum price.242 The United States has also actively 
promoted the increase of cigarette addiction in developing countries, 
by helping cigarette manufacturers donate tobacco to these countries, 
and by providing export assistance to the tobacco industry.243 From the 
238The Narcotics Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee issued a report 
on the seriousness of prescription drug abuse in the mid-1950s. This report suggested that the 
problem was more serious than narcotic traffic because it attacked a broader segment of society. 
See PEKKANEN, supra note 233, at 25-26. 
239 See id. at 28. This decision to exclude psychotropic drugs from the Narcotics Act was not 
based on drug semantics-cocaine was purposefully included in the Narcotics Act of 1914 even 
though it is not technically a narcotic. See id. at 28-31. Because the manufacture and distribution 
of these substances was legal, and their use so important to the psychiatric profession, Congress 
decided that the states should take responsibility for controlling their abuse. Id. For ten years, 
the federal government remained committed to this states' rights argument, avoiding even 
minimal control of the manufacture and distribution of these highly addictive drugs. See id. at 
56-59. 
240 See id. at 173. 
241 See supra note 195 regarding "rent seeking" and the power of lobbying firms. 
242 In addition to internal subsidies that currently cost federal tax payers $15 million per year, 
between 1966 and 1972, the U.S. government spent $200 million on export subsidies. WHELAN, 
supra note 230, at 148; see also RUTH ROEMER, LEGISLATIVE ACTION TO COMBAT THE WORLD 
TOBACCO EPIDEMIC 72-73 (2nd ed. 1993) (discussing government subsidies for tobacco products 
in the United States and other countries). 
243 During the 1960s the U.S. government spent hundreds of thousands of dollars advertising 
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mid-1950s until 19S0, the U.S. Department of Agriculture shipped 
between $17 million and $66 million in tobacco products per year as 
part of the Food for Peace program.244 More recently, the U.S. Trade 
Representative has used the threat of sanctions under § 301 of the 1974 
U.S. Trade Act to force Asian countries to open their markets to U.S. 
tobacco products.245 
The result of the United States government's promotion of ciga-
rette addiction has been devastating. InJapan, a twenty-year downward 
trend in the number of smokers was reversed within two years of the 
aggressive introduction of foreign cigarettes. In China, the average 
number of cigarettes smoked per person increased by more than SO 
per year during the year following the opening of its market. In Korea, 
smoking is currently increasing by 4.7% per year compared with a 
previous 1.5% increase.246 During the push for new cigarette markets 
in the 19S0s, cigarette smoking increased by 33% in Mrica and by 24% 
in Latin America.247 Probably the greatest harm caused by increased 
cigarette consumption has occurred in developing countries, where 
the cost of cigarette addiction takes food from the mouths of hungry 
children.248 The cost of this increased consumption goes far beyond 
malnutrition. It is currently estimated that during the 1990s, one mil-
lion people per year will die in developing countries from tobacco-re-
lated diseases.249 
The only way to account for the difference in U.S. policy toward 
cocaine and other illicit drugs on the one hand, and treatment of 
cigarettes inJapan, Thailand and AusUia. The government likewise promoted increased cigarette 
addiction in developed counUies by producing and disUibuting a 23-minute promotional film 
entitled "The World of Pleasure" for disUibution to most of Western Europe and the United Arab 
Republic. WHELAN, supra note 230, at 98. 
244 Id. at 167; see also GoODIN, supra note 228, at 119 (discussing the Food for Peace program 
in which the U.S. government compelled counUies to buy tobacco in exchange for economic 
assistance) . 
245RoEMER, supra note 242, at 74-76. In 1986, the U.S. government pressured Japan to 
eliminate a 28% tariff on foreign cigarettes. Later that year, the Trade Representative attacked 
China's closed cigarette market. The Chinese government, fearing the impact of foreign ciga-
rettes on the health of its people, offered to import any other U.S. product. China's pleas went 
unheeded-the U.S. Trade Representative insisted that China drop quotas and tariffs and lift 
advertisement resUictions on foreign cigarettes. Likewise, in 1987, the U.S. convinced Korea to 
open its market under the threat of trade sanctions to its textile market, and in 1989, the Trade 
Representative filed an action against Thailand. See id. 
246 Id. at 75-76. 
247 GoODIN, supra note 228, at 116-17. 
246For example, researchers in Bangladesh estimate that the use of income for smoking 
rather than food results in halving the prospects for survival of 18,000 children in Bangladesh 
alone each year. Id. at 117. 
249RoEMER, supra note 242, at 151. 
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addictive legal substances on the other, is to note two distinctions: the 
difference in the economic value to the United States of the two classes 
of drugs, and the difference in the segments of society that depend on 
the various drugs. In contrast to cocaine, which is produced solely in 
Latin America, the production of alcohol, cigarettes, and prescription 
drugs is largely supported and controlled by resources and industries 
within the United States. These major industries playa significant role 
in the American economy, providing substantial revenue and jobs,250 
as well as generating billions of tax dollars. The power and influence 
wielded by the alcohol, tobacco, and pharmaceutical industries and 
their political constituents are apparent from the United States gov-
ernment's promotion of these products, as well as the forceful oppo-
sition afforded any attempt to increase government interference with 
their manufacture, distribution, or use.251 The contrasting treatment of 
increased narcotics regulation in the early 20th century highlights the 
role that powerful economic interests have played in creating the 
division between legal and illegal drug policy. No powerful pharma-
ceuticallobby fought against governmental regulation of these largely 
imported illegal substances; on the contrary, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) forcefully campaigned for their prohibition.252 This 
desire to control distribution and use of narcotic substances was not 
motivated by the harmful effects of narcotic consumption. Rather, 
the AMA's actions were prompted by economic concerns-physicians 
feared that a rapid increase in the use of patent narcotic medications 
created undue competition for the medical profession.253 
To sum up, proscribed substances are the drugs of choice, some 
would say necessity, of the lower economic classes; prescribed sub-
stances are the drugs of the middle and upper classes. A drug policy 
focused on cocaine and other illicit substances thus poses less political 
risk than does a policy attempting to deal with the nation's legal drug 
problem; the former policy mainly impacts disenfranchised members 
of society.254 Not only is such a policy unlikely to receive much opposi-
250 The tobacco industry alone accounts directly for almost 700,000 jobs. Anna Quindlen, 
Public and Private; Whem There's Smoke, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1994, at A15. 
251 See supra notes 239-41 and accompanying text. Attempts to regulate alcohol and tobacco 
were hindered by political maneuverings designed to serve the interests of the industries manu-
facturing and distributing these substances. See supra note 195. One scholar points out that 
federal alcohol prohibition gained a foothold only after the coalition between the distillers (hard 
liquor) and the brewers (beer) broke down. THORTON, supra note 138, at 55. 
252THORNTON, supra note 138, at 59. 
253Id. 
254This group largely consists of the poor and the young, particularly the politically disaf-
fected members of these segments of the population. See supra note 232. 
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tion from the drug users and traffickers directly impacted by it, but 
this policy is also able to command popular support from those who 
view illicit drug use as socially deviant. By focusing on illegal addiction, 
the United States drug policy permits the majority of citizens to persist 
in their own "legal" forms of addiction, free from government inter-
ference, regardless of the harm they inflict on either themselves or 
society. 255 
Books are written, speeches given, conferences held, and from 
time to time influential appeals to reason are made, but if the forego-
ing assessment of the obstacles to reform of the prohibition policy is 
accurate, so too is the title to this section of the paper, "Government 
Will Not Change Prohibition Policy." 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN STRATEGY 
Governments are persuaded to change policy in one of two gen-
eral ways: public discourse or coercion. Typically, major change results 
from a combination of the two. There has been endless debate and 
discourse, to no avail. What has been missing thus far in the drug 
equation are any credible coercive counter-forces. From where and in 
what forms might those forces develop? If identification of those who 
stand to gain the most from the prohibition policy explains the forces 
that sustain it,256 then identifying those who stand to lose may help 
identify potential forces of resistance and coercion. 
There are many losers in the drug wars. However, only three 
immediately suggest themselves as potentially coalescent and organ-
ized, and therefore capable of offering a serious threat of countervail-
ing force.257 The first consists of the administrators of the criminal 
justice system-from judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, to 
police forces-concerned with the intolerable strain the drug war has 
put on the justice system. The second potential opposition force might 
come from the most affected inner-city populations. The third, and 
most promising source of resistance, are the drug-producing nations. 
In the United States, there have been instances when judges have 
openly professed their opposition to laws they are duty-bound to en-
255 Moreover, the policy validates the vast majority's choice of escape from life's problems by 
making the abuse of legal substances appear a health problem, while defining the abuse of illicit 
drugs as a criminal problem. 
256 See supra Part III B. 
257 Drug users are among the big losers in the drug war and though they offer resistance and 
might even mount sporadic forays, there is no conceivable way to form a coalition around a group 
comprising mainly of pariahs. 
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force, but these instances are rare. The primary example of this phe-
nomenon occurred during the rise of abolition sentiment leading up 
to the Civil War, when many judges either refused to enforce, or found 
ways to avoid, the fugitive slave laws.258 Last year, a few federal judges 
announced their unwillingness to hear drug enforcement cases.259 In 
the past, public defenders and legal aid lawyers have mounted strike 
actions and threats, largely based on the claim that the system has 
placed intolerable burdens on them by compromising their ability to 
meet the ethical standards of adequate representation.260 Although 
judges and lawyers have the ability through parallel, if not concerted 
action, to force the government to review its drug enforcement poli-
cies, the chances of this happening on a wide-enough scale to make a 
difference are minimal. 
The second source of conceivable opposition derives from inner-
city populations who have suffered the brunt of the baleful effects of 
the drug war. Inasmuch as this group is predominantly made up of 
minorities, the inherent solidarity of this group presents a credible 
potential for coercive force. Moreover, there have been times in the 
recent past when minority populations have mounted effective move-
ments, both in the form of riots,261 and, more appealingly, in the form 
of marches, demonstrations, or other concerted acts of civil disobedi-
ence.262 Similarly, in parts of Latin America, when pushed too hard by 
government prohibition efforts, peasant collective movements have 
demonstrated their power to at least defend their own interests.263 
258 In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 536 (1842), Justice Story, writing for the m,yority, held 
that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was self-enforcing and needed no aid from legislation, state 
or national. Justice Story's son had characterized his father's opinion as a not too subtle sabotage 
of the enforceability of the Act. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 241 (1975). 
259Jack Weinstein, AJurist Who's Willing to Lead, NAT'L Lj., Dec. 27, 1993 at S3 (describing 
Weinstein's refusal to hear drug cases because of sentencing guidelines); Criticizing Sentencing 
Rules, U.S. Judge Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1990, at A22 (detailing Judge J. Lawrence Irving's 
decision not to hear drug cases because of harsh sentencing guidelines). 
260 A public defenders' strike has been advocated, based on their inability to effectively 
represent their clients. Andy Court & Kevin Bell, Public Defenders: To The Barricades, AM. LAw., 
May, 1992, at 99. See al.50ANDREw KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY 587-88 
(3d ed. 1989) (discussing whether strikes by lawyers in the Legal Aid Society of New York, in 1974, 
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility). 
261 See supra notes 7 and 60; see generally James H. Johnson & Walter C. Farrell, The Fire This 
Time: The Genesis of the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992,71 N.C. L. REv. 1403 (1993). 
262 It is hard to imagine marches in favor of drug decriminalization. However, it is less difficult 
to foresee the formation of a coalition of families and friends of those who have been incarcer-
ated, injured or killed in the course of the war on drugs, seeking a way to confront the government's 
policy. The open sale of marijuana, as a starting place, would soon present the government with 
the dilemma of how to prevent the overwhelming of the criminal justice system. 
263 See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. 
70 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15:19 
There are many reasons to believe that this particular counter-
force will never develop.264 First, and possibly most importantly, the 
affected minority community is internally divided over drug policy. 
Many leaders in the African-American community perceive drugs as a 
scourge, particularly devastating to their people and community.265 
They consider the anti-prohibitionist movement anathema.266 Second, 
it is difficult to see how a movement emerging from the anguish of the 
inner-city communities, and possibly fueled by the pent-up rage of 
blacks, could find support and allies in the larger population of the 
sort that the civil rights movement generated through its moral claims. 
Third, and this is admittedly based on hardly more than a feeling for 
the temper of the times, there is a mean and sour mood running 
through the United States at this moment267 that might support a very 
repressive reaction to any concerted efforts by minorities to force a 
change in drug policy. 
Finally, let us turn to the most promising source of countervailing 
force-developments in the producing countries, especially Colombia. 
For years, a cornerstone of the United States foreign policy toward the 
drug-producing nations of South America has been insistence upon 
steadfast commitment to the drug war. When interdiction and source-
suppression methods were ratcheted-up during the Reagan-Bush Ad-
ministrations, the consequences for Peru, Bolivia, and most of all, 
Colombia, were terrible. 268 The United States conditioned economic 
assistance and favorable trade treatment on compliance with what 
amounted to an anti-drug crusade. Initially, this foreign policy com-
ported with the interests of the ruling classes and the military of the 
producing nations, even as it alienated many segments of the popula-
tion, especially those who depend on the cocaine trade,269 as well as 
264 As Dr. Szasz rightly noted, the author does not intend to speak for anyone, either groups 
with which the author is classified, or most assuredly groups to which the author does not belong. 
See SZASZ, supra note 15, at 111. 
265 See id. at 117. But see Letwin, supra note 45, at 828 n.169. 
266 See, e.g., Charles B. Rangel, Legalize Drugs? Not on Your Life, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1988, at 
A25. For a discussion of the view held by Rep. Rangel, see David Tuller, Surgeon General's Remarks 
Debate Changing in War on Drugs, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 11, 1993, at AI; see also Paul Ruffins, To Fight 
Crime, Some Blacks Attack Gun Contro~ L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1992, at M2 (discussing the recent 
spread of libertarian arguments about drugs and gun control); Letwin, supra note 45, at 828 
n.169 (citing poll that showed support for legalization to be lower among Mrican Americans and 
Latinos than among whites). 
267 Perhaps the clearest evidence of this is Proposition 187, approved by the California voters 
in 1994. This proposition denies most public services, including public education and health 
care, other than emergency care, to all illegal aliens and their children. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., 
Californians Pass Measure on Aliens; Courts Bar It, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at B7. 
268 See supra notes 133, 146--47. 
269 See supra note 138. The growing of coca leaves is estimated to involve 300,000 people in 
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many intellectuals.270 In the process, however, the Andean states were 
pushed to near anarchy as the drug cartels, revolutionary political 
movements, and the governments engaged in a running war.271 Even-
tually, the instability generated by the "internal wars" led the political 
leadership throughout the region to distance itself from the excessive 
demands of the United States' policy.272 
Possibly reacting to the signs of political disaffection in Colombia 
and Peru, the Bush Administration in 1990 embarked on a new initia-
tive to promote hemispheric cooperation on drug matters. President 
Bush sought to dramatize this approach by attending the "summit" in 
Cartagena, Colombia. The Cartagena state men t of principles promised 
a shift toward multi-lateral solutions.273 For the first time, the United 
States admitted that reduction of demand was as important as suppres-
sion of supply. The agreement called for areas of cooperation, includ-
ing crop substitution, economic aid, licensing of chemicals used in 
cocaine processing, and controls on arms shipments and small aircraft 
sales.274 Within months, however, the spirit of collaboration began to 
dissipate. Mter the United States Navy seized Colombian ships without 
prior notice, the newly-elected President, Gaviria Trujillo, stated that 
his government's highest priority in the drug war was not international 
Peru. 1993 WALDEN COUNTRY REpORTS: PERU, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, World File. It is 
estimated that the cocaine trade employs over 200,000 people in Colombia, making the industry 
one of the largest employers in the country. RILEY, supra note 1, at 15. Cartel members cultivate 
public support by financing public works, housing projects, and national sports teams, and by 
protecting the population from guerrilla attacks. Id. at 28. 
270 "Even before the Colombian [Supreme Court] decision, two thousand Latin American 
intellectuals signed a manifesto in which novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez wrote, 'The drug 
polemic must not continue to be caught between war and permissiveness .... '" C. Torres, Legalize 
It?, NATION, June 20, 1994, at 857. See also Tracy Wilkinson, Image vs. Reality in Colombia: A Soccer 
Star's Slaying is the Latest Blow to a Drug-Besieged Nation Struggling to Redefine Itself, The Identity 
Conflict Creates a Schizophrenic Society and Fuels Tensions with U.S. Over How to Fight Narcotics 
War, L.A. TIMES, July 8,1994, at Al (noting that a "growing movement among intellectuals such 
as Nobel laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez" favors legalization). 
271 See generally RILEY, supra note 1, passim. 
272 During the last decade, the Latin American political leadership has vacillated between 
tough enforcement measures (marked by support of extradition of "traficantes" to the United 
States, cooperation with United States' interdiction efforts and anti-terrorist campaigns), and 
attempts to negotiate with the drug cartels. See id. at 30-41 (concerning government policies with 
respect to political violence, drug industry murders, and death squad murders as correlated to 
counternarcotics policy). 
273There have been many calls for this approach in the past and there is little question that 
multilateral cooperation and regional or international collaboration would be a marked improve-
ment over the hegemonic stability theory pursued for so long by the United States. See Lisa L. 
Martin, Foundations for International Cooperation, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, supra note 
10, at 252-53; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Critical Reflections on International and National Control 
of Drugs, 18 DENV.]. INT'L L. & POL'y 311 (1990). 
274 See Gugliotta, supra note 122, at 120, 128; Bagley, supra note 122, at 138-39. 
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smuggling, but ending narco-terrorism. Accordingly, he announced 
that the government would not extradite traffickers if they renounced 
terrorism and submitted to criminal prosecution in Colombia.275 This 
refreshing sign of independence may foreshadow new initiatives. 
In the last few years there have been growing signs that the govern-
ments of the Andean region are considering a more independent drug 
policy. A recent Colombian Supreme Court opinion decriminalizing 
the personal use of small amounts of drugs is one straw in the wind.276 
The fact that the former Prosecutor of Colombia, Gustavo de Greiff, 
openly advocated legalizing drugs is further indication that a break 
with the anti-drug policy could be in the offing.277 President Fujimori 
of Peru has not called for legalization, but he bluntly declared the 
Peruvian-United States drug policy "a failure."278 
Naturally, disassociation from the United States-driven drug poli-
cies by the Andean governments will not be easy. In purely economic 
terms the region is in conflict. On the one hand, the drug trade 
contributes substantially to the region's gross national product, both 
directly in terms of exports and indirectly in terms of employment and 
re-investment of drug profitS.279 On the other hand, the United States, 
the most influential foreign power in Latin America in both political 
and economic terms,280 continues to threaten cut-offs of economic 
275Bagley, supra note 122, at 139. 
276 See supra note 192. Subsequently, the government issued a decree limiting personal "use 
in public places, and forbidding consumption by minors, pregnant women and government 
employees." Colombia Tries to Renew Ban on Drug Usage, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 2, 1994, at A6. The 
government recently stated that it would submit legislation to modifY the Constitution and forbid 
drug consumption again. Id. 
277 See Don Podesta & Douglas Farah, A Captain in the Drug War Wants to Call It Off, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 8, 1994, at A4. The prosecutor noted that "[l]egalization is the worst thing that could 
happen to drug traffickers." Id. The fact that remnants of the Medellin drug cartel had threatened 
to kill him and President-elect Ernesto Samper "in such a way that will make everyone'sjaw drop," 
only tends to affirm his point. Id. 
278 Don Podesta & Douglas Farah, Drug Policy in Andes Called Failure; Years of Efforts Funded 
I7y U.S. Show Few Results, If Any, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 1993, at AI; see also supra notes 145-46. 
But see James Brooke, Peru Combats Drug Traffic, Winning U.S. Team's Praise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 1995, at A2. 
279 The leaders of Colombia contend "that no more than $2 billion in drug money is 
repatriated to Colombia annually; the [Drug Enforcement Agency] puts the figure at $7 billion. 
That compares with Colombia's total [GNP] last year of $34.2 billion." Michael S. Serrill, Is It the 
Last Battle? Under U.S. Pressure, President-elect Samper Gives a New Impetus to the Antidrug War, 
TiME INT'L, Aug. 8, 1994, at 15. 
280 For example, with respect to natural commodities-petroleum, coffee, coal and fruit-the 
principal trading partners of Colombia are: the United States, 44%; European Community, 21 %; 
and Japan, 5%. With respect to manufactured commodities the breakdown is: the United States, 
36%; European Community, 16%; Brazil, 4%; Japan, 3%. 1993 U.S. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 86 [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK] (figures given are from 1991). 
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assistance should the governments of the region stray from strict drug 
enforcement policies.281 It is impossible, in view of these conflicting 
pressures, to ascertain whether Colombia will indeed set out upon an 
independent drug-policy course, or will simply revert to a more prag-
matic approach. That approach, viewed objectively, entails periodic 
enforcement sufficient to satisfY the United States, but not strong or 
consistent enough to substantially interfere with the drug trade. This 
middle course may have made sense in the past, on the ground that it 
assured both continuous assistance and drug trade profits. However, 
the costs of this approach, even in economic terms, may have passed 
the point of diminishing returns.282 
Nevertheless, assuming that Colombia, and other states that might 
join it, decided to break with the anti-drug policy, what might that 
entail? Radically, the producing states might exercise their sovereign 
rights to formally withdraw from existing international agreements,283 
281 In a statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 22, 1994, Robert 
Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, discussed U.S. tactics to 
combat international narcotics trafficking. 5 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH 440, 440-41, Gune 
27, 1994). He outlined President Clinton's "counter-narcotics directive" which instructs the 
Department of State to apply stringent standards in the congressionally mandated certification 
process-a process that can result in the denial of assistance to countries that do not cooperate 
fully with the United States in counter-narcotics or take adequate steps on their own. Id. Mter 
complimenting Colombia for its successful actions against the Medellin cartel, Mr. Gelbard also 
added that "[w]e have sent a strong message to Colombia's President-elect, Ernesto Samper, that 
the crackdown on the Cali cartel must not falter if Colombia wants to sustain close relations with 
the United States." Id. at 441. Of course, it cannot be discounted that this may only be rhetoric 
from the United States government. At another point in the statement Mr. Gelbard noted that 
"Bolivia and Peru had not met the requirements for 'full' certification primarily because their 
efforts to attack coca cultivation were insufficient, but they were granted vital national interest 
certifications." Id. at 443. 
282 The costs to Colombia attributable to drug enforcement were estimated in 1990 to exceed 
$1 billion. James Brooke, High Cost of Fighting Drugs Strains U.S., Colombian Ties, N.Y. TiMES, 
June 4,1990, at D1. This only reflects budgeting costs. The costs in lives lost, corruption, and the 
undermining of the institutions of society are incalculable. However measured, these costs are 
far greater than the combined economic U.S. aid which is $115.7 billion for fiscal years 1980-
1989. WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 280, at 405. Even if the United States contributes approxi-
mately 40% of Colombia's balance of trade surplus of $2 billion-a 1992 estimate--Colombia 
would still come out in the red. See WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 280, at 6-7 (extrapolations 
based on reported figures). There is a strong argument that in economic terms, the resort to 
drug cultivation in developing countries has an overall negative impact. See Bassiouni, supra note 
273, at 326 (quoting extensively from DRUG TRAFFICKING AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, U.N. DEP'T 
OF PUB. INFO., U.N. Doc. DPI/1040B-40076 Gan. 1990)). 
283For example, the nations could denounce the 1988 United Nations Convention Against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances under Article 30. U.N. Doc. 
E/Conf.82/15 reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 497, 524-25 (1989). In addition, Mexico could terminate the 
Mexico-United States Agreement on Cooperation in Combatting Narcotics Trafficking and Drug 
Dependency under Article VI. 29 I.L.M. 58, 61 (1990). For a comprehensive coverage of the 
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declaring the trade and export of cocaine legal.284 Following such a 
declaration,285 participating states would do whatever they could to 
normalize and facilitate their local cocaine industries.286 
The United States almost certainly would oppose such a step with 
the full force of its international power and influence.287 Therefore, it 
is conceded that this may not be a realistic proposal.288 However, an 
equally radical proposal would present the United States with a di-
lemma. This second proposal builds on the idea that the drug cartel 
international legal regime for controlling drugs since 1912, see Bassiouni, supra note 273, at 312 
& nn.3-4. 
284The cultivation of "illicit drugs" is considered legitimate under existing international 
conventions if carried on under the control of the government. Bassiouni, supra note 273, at 315 
& n.12. 
Before a moral consensus developed regarding the slave trade, a trade that is clearly distin-
guishable from the drug trade in that it involved unwilling participants, international law was 
interpreted to allow each country to determine its own course regarding the far more pernicious 
slave trade. SeeThe Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825) (Marshall, CJ. opinion). 
285 To give any credence to such a bold move, the states of the region would have to act 
immediately, or better still, in advance, to redirect their trade orientation toward the other major 
international trading blocs, Western Europe and Japan. Generally, the European countries have 
gone along internationally with the U.S. prohibition stance; however, most of these nations have 
pursued a more flexible regulatory approach, internally, to drug use. See VALLANCE, supra note 
15, at 21-25. The Japanese have consistently taken amoral positions with respect to international 
trade matters, almost single-mindedly pursuing a pragmatic course. 
286 Contrary to conventional thinking, the profits generated by a legitimate cocaine trade 
would remain intact, as many of the costs of running an illicit business would be eliminated. See 
Bassiouni, supra note 273, at 325-28. Also, since the growing conditions for coca plants are 
virtually unique to the Andes, the Andean nations would retain a natural monopoly position. 
. 287The Clinton Administration, whatever its own views on prohibition, would be politically 
savaged if it did not resolutely and strongly oppose such a development. Should President Clinton 
be re-elected, he could respond more flexibly in a second term, but ironically a Republican 
administration would be better positioned to reform U.S. drug policies, just as it was better 
positioned to change the China policy it had supported so vociferously before the change. The 
Clinton Administration has already demonstrated its limited maneuverability on drug policy 
reform. The Attorney General of Colombia, Gustavo De Greiff, declined an invitation to an 
anti-Prohibition conference sponsored by the Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts on May 21, 
1994 at Harvard Law School, citing "threats by the U.S. Department of Justice and Senator John 
Kerry" which convinced him that he could cause serious problems for Colombia by attending. 
CLUM Conference Puts Drug Prohibition Debate on NationalAgenda, 24 THE DOCKET 3 (Aug. 1994). 
In retaliation for De Greiffs policy of negotiating with drug traffickers, Washington suspended 
its practice of sharing evidence with Colombian judicial officials, jeopardizing some fifty drug-
trafficking cases. See Wilkinson, supra note 270, at AI. De Greiff recently reached the mandatory 
retirement age of 65, and the Colombian Supreme Court refused to grant a waiver. See David Van 
Bienna, Sweet, Sweet, Surrender, TIME, Nov. 7, 1994, at 46,48. 
288 Nevertheless, there are signs that Colombia has reached its limits of tolerance for the 
existing conditions. "The concern for image, combined with a volatile sense of nationalism, has 
created a deep ambivalence about the drug war among many Colombians, who say they would 
like to clean up their government ... but who resist and resent pressure from Washington to 
fight the traffickers more forcefully. Increasingly, Colombians speak of legalizing drugs .... " 
Wilkinson, supra note 270, at AI. 
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leaders may be ready to consider cooperating in order to begin to 
legitimize their activity.2s9 Just as OPEC used the mechanism of a world-
wide oil embargo to instigate a restructuring of the international pe-
troleum markets, the leaders of the drug cartels might be induced to 
curtail all cocaine shipments with the purpose of restructuring their 
enterprise. A cut-off would have dramatic impact on consumers. A 
possible consequence that cocaine operators might not be willing to 
risk is that hard-core users would switch to other substances.29o If the 
shift is toward opium derivatives, especially heroin, or to synthetics, the 
short term interests of the cocaine operators would be hurt. 29] In the 
longer term, however, as the more devastating effects of heroin use are 
felt, the United States might be moved to adopt a "relative evil" ap-
proach, and decriminalize marijuana use, or even seek a regulated 
form of cocaine use.292 
V. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing proposals are not made in the naive belief that they 
will be viewed as currently realistic or feasible. Instead, the proposals 
are mooted in order to suggest that the manifestation of an inde-
pendent mindset among leaders of the Andean states may hasten the 
day when even the "giant of the North" will have to face the truth about 
the futility of its drug policy. Once the initiative is seized by such 
leaders, the United States Departments of State and Commerce could 
289The idea of negotiating with drug traffickers strikes some as morally reprehensible, but 
recent developments in Colombia, where cartel leaders attempted to negotiate a "retirement," 
suggest that this idea is not unthinkable there. Gugliotta, supra note 122, at 126-28; see also Van 
Bienna, supra note 287, at 46-48. It would be difficult, if not impossible, however, to sell the idea 
that the people that we formerly demonized now might receive a "buy-out" underwritten by the 
U.S. taxpayer. Nevertheless, the majority of Americans did not balk at that idea in connection 
with the removal of the junta in Haiti in October, 1994. 
290 Substitutability is a complex and speculative "science." See Peter Reuter, After the Borders 
are Sealed: Can Domestic Sources Substitute for Imported Drugs, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS, 
supra note 10, at 163-77. A total cut-off, which is what the United States government professes 
it wants, might actually create such havoc in the cities of the United States that it would force the 
government to reconsider its attitude toward drug use. Like it or not, the truth is that some of 
the advances in the area of civil rights laws followed serious outbreaks of rioting in the cities of 
this country. One of the most immediate consequences of a cocaine cut-off possibly would be 
widespread rioting in the inner cities. 
291 In the long run, a move toward regulated use would benefit the cocaine operators, because 
presently their overhead costs cut deeply into their profits. At present, "most of the profits stay 
in the hands of distributors, or middlemen, rather than the producers .... [Also,) most profits 
accrue outside of Latin America ... which suggests that a large share of drug money probably 
remains in the United States." Smith, supra note 10, at 11. 
292 See VALLANCE, supra note 15, at 88. As to the relative harmfulness of heroin, see generally 
KAPLAN, supra note 23. 
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face some hard questions. For example, in an international forum 
convened to respond to the threatened repudiation of the existing 
convention on illicit drugs, the United States might well be confronted 
with the numerous instances when, in its own interest, it cynically 
supported the very drug trafficking it so loudly condemned.293 Or, 
beyond mere embarrassment, it might be forced to distinguish and 
defend its major drug export-tobacco.294 It is conceivable that, faced 
with the possibility of seeing tobacco and alcohol placed on the list of 
proscribed substances, the United States would begin to take the in-
cremental steps295 that would lead itself, and the nations of the world, 
toward a more humane and sane drug policy. 
293 The involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in illicit drug transactions with 
former President Noriega of Panama is the most notorious instance of such conduct. See Stephen 
Engelberg & Jeff Gerth, The Noriega Case: Intelligence operations; U.S. Worry: What Damage Can 
Noriega Do?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1990, at AI; see also Noriega's Lawyers Say He Got Rich Uy Spying, 
N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at A22. But there have been many other such instances of U.S. 
involvement in-and support of --drug trafficking. For example, there was the Drug Enforcement 
Agency's (DEA) alleged involvement with transference of funds through drug operators in 
connection with the so-called Iran-Contra affair. See DYCUS, BERNEY ET AL, supra note 106, at 
339. For more recent examples, see Tim Weiner, Suit Uy Drug Agent Says U.S. Sulroerted His 
Burmese Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at A9 (claims by a DEA special agent that the State 
Department and the CIA subverted his anti-drug efforts in Myanmar, formerly Burma); John 
Kifner, Mission to Haiti: History; Haitians Ask of u.s. Links To Attaches, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 6, 1994, 
at A8 (reports that the CIA poured money into the army hierarchy in Haiti, before the junta was 
ousted, despite the fact that high-ranking officers went into the drug business themselves). 
One of the most egregious cases concerned the revelation that the CIA withheld intelligence 
regarding the murder in Mexico of a DEA agent, supposedly because it feared compromising 
CIA sources connected with traffickers who provided intelligence on Communist insurgencies in 
Central America and logistical support for U.S. covert aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. Bagley, 
supra note 122, at 134. Purportedly, it was Colonel Oliver North's decision to leak DEA photo-
graphs to the press, "revealing Sandinista complicity in cocaine trafficking", that exposed the 
DEA's surveillance operations in Nicaragua. Id. This conduct should be compared to the treat-
ment to which the United States subjected a Mexican citizen whom it suspected was involved in 
the events surrounding another DEA agent's death. In that case, the United States participated 
in the abduction of the Mexican citizen. The Supreme Court of the United States upheld this 
"extralegal arrest" in the face of an extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico, and 
despite claims that the abduction violated international principles and analogous principles of 
U.S. constitutional law. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). 
The Clinton Administration has pursued a policy of accommodation with Syria in spite of 
findings by Congress and the DEA that Syria is heavily involved in drug trafficking. Yedidya Atlas, 
Syria Gets a Free Pass, INSIGHT, Aug. 30, 1993, at 6. 
294 See supra notes 227-49 and accompanying text. 
295 See Jefferson Fish, Discontinuous Change and the War on Drugs, 54 HUMANIST 14 (Sept. 
1994), for an intriguing discussion concerning the discontinuous change model for the way in 
which qualitative drug-policy reform will arise. The thesis is that discontinuous change is like the 
turning of a kaleidoscope: some event may precipitate a sudden re-ordering. It is possible that a 
shift in the response by the producing states, as proposed, could unexpectedly set off processes 
of major change. The author draws the analogy to the "sudden" collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the "cold war." More aptly, perhaps, the analogy suggested here is the end of the state 
of war between sworn enemies, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. 
